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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Alma Celeste Defillo, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000600 
ORDER 
Respondent is a lawyer previously admitted to the practice of law in Florida who 
operated a law firm and offered legal services in South Carolina.1  On August 13, 
2014, this Court permanently debarred respondent from seeking any form of 
admission to practice law in South Carolina and imposed other sanctions.2  In the 
Matter of Defillo, 4009 S.C 314, 762 S.E.2d 592 (2014).  The Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to appoint the Receiver, Peyre T. 
Lumpkin, to protect the interest of respondent's South Carolina clients pursuant to 
Rule 31of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in 
Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).   
IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Lumpkin is hereby appointed to protect the interests of 
respondent's South Carolina clients.  Mr. Lumpkin shall assume responsibility for 
respondent's South Carolina client files and any trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), or other law office account(s) respondent may 
maintain in this state. Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's
trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
account(s) respondent may maintain in this state that are necessary to effectuate 
this appointment.   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall immediately forward all client 
files and property, bank statements, cancelled checks, disbursement schedules, 
1 Respondent is not licensed to practice law in South Carolina.
2 At the time of the debarment, respondent was a member of the Florida Bar.  On 
January 23, 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida suspended respondent from the 
practice of law in that state for one (1) year. 
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trust account records, and the like which have any nexus to her South Carolina 
clients to Mr. Lumpkin.  Without regard to the location of the funds, respondent 
shall immediately deliver all client funds which have any nexus to her South 
Carolina clients to Mr. Lumpkin.  Mr. Lumpkin shall deposit these funds in a 
separate account and may make disbursements from the account that are necessary 
to effectuate this appointment.    
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre T. Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail 
addressed to her South Carolina office and the authority to direct that this mail be 
delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office.  Respondent shall promptly forward all other 
mail related to any South Carolina clients to Mr. Lumpkin. 
Respondent shall promptly respond to Mr. Lumpkin's requests for information 
and/or documentation and shall fully cooperate with Mr. Lumpkin in all other 
respects. 
This appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless 
request is made to this Court for an extension. 
                                
 
   s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
March 24, 2015 
 
2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OPINIONS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

AND 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF
 
SOUTH CAROLINA 

ADVANCE SHEET NO. 13 

April 1, 2015 

Daniel E. Shearouse, Clerk 

Columbia, South Carolina 

www.sccourts.org 

3 

 
 
 CONTENTS 

  
 THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

    
  
PUBLISHED OPINIONS AND ORDERS 

 
27512 - The State v. Lexi Dial         11 
  
Order - In the Matter of Leo A. Dryer, Respondent 13 
 
Order - In the Matter of Joseph Dargan McMaster, Respondent  15 
 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
2015-MO-015 - Christopher Anderson v. State 
 
PETITIONS – UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
27452 - The State v. William Coaxum, Sr.   Pending 
 
2010-173586 - Bayan Aleksey v. State   Pending 
 
2014-001128 - The State v. Derringer Young           
Pending 
 
2013-001053 - James Prather v. State       Pending 
 
 
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 
 
 
27484 - Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia  Pending 
             Healthcare System, et al. v. The South Carolina  
Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting 
Association, et al. 
 
27486 - Carolina First Bank v. Badd  Pending 
 
27488 - The State v. Kenneth D. Morris, II Pending 
 
27491 - The State v. George L. Chavis  Pending 
 
27497 - The State v. Mark Baker  Pending 
 
 
 
4 

  
 
 
5 

27502 - The State of SC v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pending 
2015-MO-005 - The State v. Henry Haygood Pending 
2015-MO-009 - The State v. Tavario Dormell Brunson Pending 
    
 
 
The South Carolina Court of Appeals 
 
 
PUBLISHED OPINIONS 

 
5306-Sean Fay v. Grand Strand Regional             16 
 
5307-George Ferbuson v. Americo/U-Haul  31 
 
5308-Henton Clemmons v. Lowe's Home Centers    41 
 
5309-Bluffton Towne Center v. Gilleland Prince 56 
 
5310-Thomas Rickerson v. John Karl, MD     72 
 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
 
2015-UP-166-SCDSS v. Patrecse Miller 
 
2015-UP-167-Cynthia Griffis v. Cherry Hill 
 
2015-UP-168-The State v. Lexie James Turner 
 
2015-UP-169-Jacquelyne Hollander v. The Irrevocable Trust Established by James Brown 
 
2015-UP-170-The State v. Rajerick Knight 
 
2015-UP-171-SCDSS v. Beauluh S. 
 
2015-UP-172-SCDSS v. Tiffani Roberts 
 
2015-UP-173-The State v. Ronasha Taylor 
 
2015-UP-174-Tommy S. Adams v. The State 
 
2015-UP-175-William R. Burgess v. Rita G. Burgess 
 
2015-UP-176-Charles Ray Dean v. The State 
 
 
6 

 PETITIONS FOR REHEARING 

 
5253-Sierra Club v. SCDHEC and Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. Pending 
 
5295-Edward Freiburger v. State Pending 
 
5297-Trident Medical Center v. SCDHEC Pending 
 
5298-George Thomas v. 5 Star Transportation Pending 
 
5299-S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. SCDOT Pending 
 
5300-Joseph E. Mason Jr., v. Catherine L. Mason, et al. Pending 
 
5301-State v. Andrew T. Looper Pending 
 
2014-UP-436-Jekeithlyn Ross v. Jimmy Ross Pending 
 
2015-UP-031-Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Gresham Pending 
 
2015-UP-041-Nathalie I. Davaut v. USC Pending 
 
2015-UP-059-In the matter of the estate of Willie Rogers Deas Pending 
 
2015-UP-065-Glenda R. Couram v. Lula N. Davis Pending 
 
2015-UP-066-State v. James Roscoe Scofield Pending 
 
2015-UP-067-Ex parte: Tony Megna Pending 
 
2015-UP-069-Gitter v. Gitter Pending 
 
2015-UP-074-State v. Akeem O. Smith Pending 
 
2015-UP-077-Derick Ward v. Margaret Ashbaugh Pending 
 
2015-UP-091-U.S. Bank v. Kelley Burr Pending 
 
2015-UP-093-Raymond Armstrong v. Samuel J. Thompson Pending 
 
2015-UP-098-State v. James Lamont Moore Pending 
 
2015-UP-102-SCDCA v. Entera Holdings Pending 
7 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
2015-UP-106-Edward Eli Saleeby, III, v. SCDMV Pending 
2015-UP-107-Roger R. Riemann v. Palmetto Gems Pending 
2015-UP-110-Deutsche Bank v. Cora B. Wilks Pending 
2015-UP-111-Ronald Jarmuth v. The International Club Pending 
2015-UP-115-State v. William Pou Pending 
2015-UP-117-State v. Keith Letmon Pending 
2015-UP-119-Denica Powell v. Petsmart Pending 
2015-UP-150-State v. Jabarrie Brown Pending 
PETITIONS-SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 
5077-Kirby L. Bishop et al. v. City of Columbia Pending 
5209-State v. Tyrone Whatley Pending 
5229-Coleen Mick-Skaggs v. William Skaggs Pending 
5231-Centennial Casualty v. Western Surety Pending 
5237-Lee C. Palms v. The School District of Greenville Cty. Pending 
5245-Allegro, Inc. v. Emmett Scully Pending 
5247-State v. Henry Haygood Pending 
5250-Precision Walls v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Pending 
5263-Milton P. Demetre Family Ltd. Partnership v. Beckmann Pending 
5265-State v. Wayne McCombs Pending 
5268-Julie Tuten v. David C. Joel Pending 
5271-Richard Stogsdill v. SCDHHS Pending 
8 

 5272-Cindy Dozier v. American Red Cross Pending 
 
5274-Duke Energy v. SCDOR  Pending 
 
5275-Mitul Enterprises v. Beaufort Cty. Assessor   Pending 
 
5276-State v. Dwayne Eddie Starks     Pending 
 
5278-State v. Daniel D'Angelo Jackson     Pending 
 
5279-Stephen Brock v. Town of Mt. Pleasant Pending 
 
5281-Greens of Rock Hill v. Rizon Commercial    Pending 
 
5282-Joseph McMaster v. John Dewitt     Pending 
 
5283-State v. Arthur Smith Pending 
 
5284-Fayrell Furr v. Horry County Pending 
 
5288-State v. Damon T. Brown Pending 
                                                                                             
2013-UP-147-State v. Anthony Hackshaw Pending 
 
2013-UP-251-Betty Jo Floyd v. Ken Baker Used Cars                  Pending 
 
2013-UP-322-A.M. Kelly Grove v. SCDHEC    Pending 
 
2014-UP-128-3 Chisolm Street v. Chisolm Street Pending  
 
2014-UP-143-State v. Jeffrey Dodd Thomas Pending 
 
2014-UP-228-State v. Taurus L. Thompson Pending 
 
2014-UP-273-Gregory Feldman v. William Casey   Pending 
 
2014-UP-304-State v. Tawanda Allen Pending 
 
2014-UP-346-State v. Jason Bauman Pending 
 
2014-UP-348-State v. Anthony Jackson Pending 
 
9 

 2014-UP-365-Fatima Karriem v. Sumter Cty. Disabilities  Pending 
 
2014-UP-367-State v. Shondre L. Williams    Pending 
 
2014-UP-381-State v. Alexander L. Hunsberger    Pending 
 
2014-UP-382-State v. Julio A. Hunsberger    Pending 
 
2014-UP-387-Alan Sheppard v. William O. Higgins   Pending 
 
2014-UP-389-James Plemmons v. State Farm Mutual   Pending 
 
2014-UP-393-Patrick Bowie v. Woodbine Estates Pending 
 
2014-UP-399-State v. Matthew B. Fullbright    Pending 
 
2014-UP-400-John Doe v. City of Duncan Pending 
 
2014-UP-409-State v. Antonio Miller Pending 
 
2014-UP-410-State v. Dominique J. Shumate    Pending 
 
2014-UP-411-State v. Theodore Manning Pending 
 
2014-UP-422-Johnson Koola v. Cambridge Two   Pending 
 
2014-UP-435-SCBT, N.A. v. Sand Dollar 31 (Meisner)  Pending 
 
2014-UP-438-CACH, LLC v. Hoffman Pending 
 
2014-UP-444-State v. Eric VanCleave Pending 
 
2014-UP-446-State v. Ubaldo Garcia, Jr. Pending 
 
2014-UP-463-State v. Victor Weldon Pending 
 
2014-UP-470-State v. Jon Wynn Jarrard, Sr.    Pending 
 
2015-UP-010-Latonya Footman v. Johnson Food Services  Pending 
 
2015-UP-039-State v. Brad A. Day     Pending 
10 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Lexie Dial, III, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001970 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Lexington County 
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27512 

Heard March 5, 2015 – Filed April 1, 2015 

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
H. Wayne Floyd, of West Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson and Assistant Attorney 
General Christina Catoe Bigelow, both of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision 
in State v. Dial, 405 S.C. 247, 746 S.E.2d 495 (Ct. App. 2013).  We now dismiss 
the writ as improvidently granted. 
11 

  
 
 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
PLEICONES, Acting Chief Justice, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., 
and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
  
In the Matter of Leo A. Dryer, Respondent 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000624 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) and respondent request the Court 
transfer respondent to incapacity inactive status pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules 
for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  ODC and respondent also request the 
Court appoint Robert Joseph Lowe, Jr., Esquire, as successor lawyer pursuant to 
Rule 31(j), RLDE. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent is transferred to incapacity inactive status until
further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Robert Joseph Lowe, Jr., Esquire, is hereby 
appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust account(s), 
escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) 
respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lowe shall take action as required by Rule 31(j), 
RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. 
Lowe may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.  Respondent shall 
promptly respond to Mr. Lowe's requests for information and/or documentation 
and shall fully cooperate with Mr. Lowe in all other respects.     
Further, this Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution 
maintaining trust, escrow, operating, and/or any other law account(s) of 
respondent, shall serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that 
Robert Joseph Lowe, Jr., has been duly appointed by this Court and that 
13 

  
respondent is enjoined from making withdrawals or transfers from or writing any 
check or other instrument on any of the account(s). 
 
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that Robert Joseph Lowe, Jr., Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lowe's office. 
 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
March 27, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Joseph Dargan McMaster, Respondent 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000639 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim 
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). 
 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any 
action regarding any trust, escrow, operating, and any other law office account(s) 
respondent may maintain at any bank or other financial institution, including, but 
not limited to, making any withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other 
instrument on the account(s). 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
March 30, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Sean D. Fay, as Personal Representative for the Estate of 
Kelly L. Fay, Deceased, Respondent/Appellant,  
v. 
Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a South 
Strand Ambulatory Care Center and Stephen W. Law, 
D.O., Dr. Richard Young, M.D., and Grand Strand 
Urology, LLP, Defendants,  
Of Whom Stephen W. Law, D.O. is also an Appellant,  
And Of Whom Dr. Richard Young, M.D., and Grand 
Strand Urology, LLP, are Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2010-167127 
Appeal From Horry County 
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge 
 
Opinion No. 5306 

Heard February 11, 2015 – Filed April 1, 2015 

 
AFFIRMED 

J. Boone Aiken III, of Aiken Bridges Elliott Tyler & 
Saleeby, P.A., of Florence, and Andrew F. Lindemann, of 
Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & 
Delgado, and Ruskin C. Foster, of Mike Kelly Law 
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Group, LLC, both of Columbia, for 

Respondent/Appellant. 

Marian Williams Scalise and Lydia Lewis Magee, both 
of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, P.A., of Myrtle 
Beach, and Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, of Richardson 
Plowden & Robinson, P.A., of Columbia, for 
Respondents. 
KONDUROS, J.: In this cross-appeal from a medical malpractice action, Sean 
Fay (Sean) argues the trial court erred in granting Dr. Richard Young's motion for 
a directed verdict on public policy grounds.  In the appeal against Sean, Dr. 
Stephen Law argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), (2) excluding evidence of Sean's admitted 
extramarital affair, and (3) refusing to enroll the judgment against him using the 
jury's determination of six percent negligence on his part and instead using joint 
and several liability.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At approximately 8:00 a.m., Saturday, January 26, 2002, Kelly Fay (Kelly), 
accompanied by her husband Sean, presented to Grand Strand Regional Medical 
Center's (the Hospital1) emergency room, complaining of abdominal and right 
flank pain. Kelly believed it was caused by a kidney stone because she had 
previously experienced the same pain, which had been a kidney stone.  Dr. Stephen 
Law, the emergency room physician, examined her approximately four minutes 
after she arrived. She complained of mild nausea but had not vomited, and she 
denied fevers and chills. Kelly initially described her pain level as being a seven 
or eight out of ten, and it decreased to a five or six out of ten after receiving pain 
medication. 
Her vital signs and temperature were normal when they were first taken.2  A 
1 The Hospital settled with Sean while this matter was pending, and that portion of 

the appeal has been remitted.   

2 The medical records show multiple vital sign readings, but her temperature was 

only taken when she arrived around 8:00 a.m.
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physical examination revealed moderate to severe flank tenderness on the right 
side, but the abdomen was soft, non-tender, and non-distended.  Dr. Law suspected 
a kidney stone and ordered a kidney, ureter, and bladder (KUB) x-ray, which 
revealed a moderate-sized kidney stone in the right kidney.  A CT scan confirmed 
this and indicated a half centimeter in diameter kidney stone in the ureter of the 
right kidney.  To rule out infection, Dr. Law also ordered a urinalysis, which 
showed no blood or bacteria in the urine. 
After deciding Kelly was stable to discharge, Dr. Law spoke with Dr. Young, the 
on-call urologist, on the telephone to make sure he was available to examine Kelly 
on Monday. However, Dr. Law testified he was not seeking advice or permission 
from Dr. Young to admit Kelly.  Dr. Law spoke with Kelly and Sean, allegedly 
informing them to immediately return to the emergency department if she 
experienced uncontrollable pain, nausea, vomiting, fever, or chills.3  Dr. Law 
additionally instructed them to call Dr. Young on Monday at 8:30 a.m. to schedule 
an appointment for that day. The nursing staff then provided written discharge 
instructions, which Kelly signed, informing the Fays to call or return to the 
emergency room if she developed a fever, intense pain, or vomiting.  Kelly and 
Sean left the emergency room at approximately 12:00 p.m., and Kelly allegedly 
looked flushed, a little warm, and red.  Notably, her temperature was not taken 
before she left. 
About an hour later, after picking up a prescription, Kelly's temperature was, as 
testified to by Sean, either 101.3 or 101.6 degrees Fahrenheit.  Over the weekend, 
she continued to experience a fever of 101.3 or 101.6 degrees Fahrenheit, severe 
chills, nausea, and vomiting.  Kelly did not return to the emergency room because 
she would alternate between feeling better and worse throughout the weekend and 
believed she could wait until her appointment on Monday with Dr. Young.  
After calling Dr. Young to schedule an appointment on Monday, Sean went to 
work that morning, planning to return to take Kelly to see Dr. Young around 2:00 
p.m. After failing to reach her by telephone several times, Sean returned home 
around 1:30 p.m. to find Kelly unresponsive, gagging, and convulsive.  EMS 
responded and found Kelly on the floor, hot to the touch, with shallow rapid 
3 Sean disputes this conversation occurred. 
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breathing. Upon arrival at the hospital, Kelly had a fever of 105 degrees.  Kelly 
died Monday evening at the emergency room from clinical sepsis.4 
Subsequently, Sean brought this wrongful death and survival action for medical 
malpractice against Dr. Law, the Hospital, and Dr. Young and his practice, Grand 
Strand Urology. The trial began on May 17, 2010.  On May 26, at the close of all 
of the evidence, the trial court granted Dr. Young's motion for a directed verdict on 
public policy grounds. The jury returned a $3 million verdict against the Hospital 
and Dr. Law two days later.5  On June 7, 2010, Dr. Law and the Hospital filed 
post-trial motions for JNOV, new trial absolute, and new trial nisi remittitur.  The 
trial court filed its orders denying all post-trial matters on June 24, 2010.  Dr. Law 
filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court ultimately denied on August 26, 
2011. This appeal followed. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
As a threshold matter, Dr. Young argues Sean failed to timely serve his notice of 
appeal, and Sean argues Dr. Law failed to timely serve his notice of appeal.  We 
find both parties' appeals are properly before us and address the merits.     
I. Grant of Dr. Young's Directed Verdict Motion 
Sean contends the trial court erred in granting Dr. Young's motion for a directed 
verdict. We disagree. 
In ruling on motions for directed verdict, "the trial court is required to view the 
evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motions."  McMillan v. Oconee Mem'l 
Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006).  "When considering 
directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority 
to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence."  
Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 319, 656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007).  "The 
issue must be submitted to the jury whenever there is material evidence tending to 
4 Clinical sepsis or septic shock is an "overwhelming blood-borne infection within 

the body."

5 The jury concluded Sean was four percent negligent and the trial court calculated 

the damages to be enrolled for the plaintiff to be $2.88 million.  
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establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror."  Id.  "Yet, this rule does not 
authorize submission of speculative, theoretical, and hypothetical views to the 
jury." Id. at 319-20, 656 S.E.2d at 388. 
The court must determine whether any evidence existed on each element of the 
cause of action. First State Sav. & Loan v. Phelps, 299 S.C. 441, 446, 385 S.E.2d 
821, 824 (1989). "If the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one 
reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied."  
Martasin v. Hilton Head Health Sys., 364 S.C. 430, 437, 613 S.E.2d 795, 799 (Ct. 
App. 2005). However, "[a] directed verdict should be granted where the evidence 
raises no issue for the jury as to the defendant's liability."  Guffey v. 
Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163, 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 
(2005). 
The appellate court will reverse the circuit court's ruling on a directed verdict 
motion only when no evidence supports the ruling or the ruling is controlled by an 
error of law. Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434-35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 
648 (2006). "The appellate court must determine whether a verdict for a party 
opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally 
construed in his [or her] favor."  Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, L.L.C., 368 S.C. 
444, 463, 629 S.E.2d 653, 663 (2006).   
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must present (1) evidence of the generally 
recognized practices and procedures that would be exercised by competent 
practitioners in a defendant doctor's field of medicine under the same or similar 
circumstances, (2) evidence that the defendant doctor departed from the recognized 
and generally accepted standards, practices, and procedures in the manner alleged 
by the plaintiff, and (3) evidence that the defendant's departure from the generally 
accepted standards and practices was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries 
and damages.  Hoard ex rel. Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 546, 694 
S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (2010). 
"The establishment of a doctor/patient relationship is a prerequisite to a claim of 
medical malpractice." Roberts v. Hunter, 310 S.C. 364, 366, 426 S.E.2d 797, 799 
(1993). "The relation is a consensual one wherein the patient knowingly seeks the 
assistance of a physician and the physician knowingly accepts him as a patient."  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  "Whether the law recognizes a particular duty is an 
issue of law to be determined by the court."  Ellis ex rel. Ellis v. Niles, 324 S.C. 
20 

 223, 227, 479 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1996). If a duty does not exist, the defendant in a 
negligence action is entitled to a directed verdict.  Id.  Although the court must 
determine whether the law recognizes a duty, "[t]he existence of a physician-
patient relationship is a question of fact for the jury."  Fuller v. Blanchard, 358 
S.C. 536, 546, 595 S.E.2d 831, 836 (Ct. App. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Roberts, our supreme court first considered whether a doctor-patient relationship 
may exist when the patient has not been examined or treated by the doctor.  310 
S.C. at 366-68, 426 S.E.2d at 799-800.  After summarizing several cases from 
other jurisdictions,6 the court concluded granting the directed verdict in favor of 
the doctor was proper when the doctor did not examine the patient or review his 
file. Id. at 366-67, 426 S.E.2d at 799. One fact distinguishable from the present 
case, however, is the patient in Roberts voluntarily left the hospital before the 
doctor had the opportunity to examine him.  Id. at 365, 426 S.E.2d at 798. 
 
In Ellis, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict for 
lack of a doctor-patient relationship and, therefore, a lack of duty.  324 S.C. at 228, 
479 S.E.2d at 49. In Ellis, neither the trauma team leader nor the second in 
command undertook treatment of the patient or supervised his care, but the team 
leader did speak to the treating physician once on the telephone.  Id. at 226, 479 
S.E.2d at 48. 
 
"[T]his court[] may affirm a trial [court's] decision on any ground appearing in the 
record and, hence, may affirm the trial [court's] correct result even though [it] may 
have erred on some other ground."  Potomac Leasing Co. v. Otts Mkt., Inc., 292 
                                        
6  See Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Ala. 1976) (finding no relationship when 
consulting physician gave treating physician his opinion of the patient's condition, 
but no evidence was presented that consulting physician consented to treat the 
patient or to act in a consulting capacity); Hill ex rel. Burton v. Kokosky, 463 
N.W.2d 265, 266-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding a doctor-patient relationship 
did not arise when the patient never sought medical advice or treatment from the 
doctor and the doctor did not have any contact with the patient, see any records, or 
even know the patient's name after the treating physician consulted with the doctor 
informally); Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 400 S.E.2d 747, 
751 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding no relationship between supervising physician 
and patient when supervising physician arrived at the hospital after the child was 
born with disabilities and after any alleged negligence occurred).   
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S.C. 603, 606, 358 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1987).  The reasoning adopted by the 
trial court is not binding upon this court if the record discloses a correct result.  Id.; 
see also Rule 220(c), SCACR. 
We find the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Young's directed verdict motion 
because Sean failed to establish the existence of a doctor-patient relationship 
between Kelly and Dr. Young.  Even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Sean, we find it shows only that Dr. Young briefly spoke with Dr. 
Law, who informed him Kelly was afebrile7 with stable vital signs, was suffering 
from a half-centimeter moderately-to-severely obstructing stone located in the 
uteropelvic junction, and had a normal urinalysis, and he was preparing to 
discharge her. No evidence in the record established a doctor-patient relationship.  
Dr. Young never communicated with Kelly, never attempted to treat Kelly, and did 
not look at her records. Further, the Hospital's provision of her medical records to 
Dr. Young's office in anticipation of the Monday appointment does not create a 
doctor-patient relationship. 
In addition, by the time Dr. Law spoke with Dr. Young, Dr. Law testified he had 
already obtained a history, lab work, vital signs, and radiology studies and had 
decided Kelly was stable for discharge.  Moreover, Dr. Law specifically testified 
he was not calling Dr. Young to get advice about Kelly or requesting him to 
evaluate her. Because "[t]he establishment of a doctor/patient relationship is a 
prerequisite to a claim of medical malpractice," and Sean failed to establish the 
existence of a doctor-patient relationship, we affirm the directed verdict.  Roberts, 
310 S.C. at 366, 426 S.E.2d at 799. 
II.  Denial of Dr. Law's JNOV Motion 
Dr. Law argues the trial court erred in denying his JNOV motion because the only 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are that (1) Dr. Law complied 
with all accepted standards of care for an emergency physician and did not cause 
harm to either Sean or Kelly and (2) the Fays' failure to return to the emergency 
room when Kelly's condition deteriorated proximately caused her death and their 
degree of fault at least exceeded fifty percent.  We disagree. 
7 Merriam-Webster defines "afebrile" as "not marked by or having a fever."  
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/afebrile. 
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In ruling on motions for directed verdict, "the trial court is required to view the 
evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motions."  McMillan, 367 S.C. at 564, 
626 S.E.2d at 886. "When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial 
court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve 
conflicts in the testimony or evidence."  Parrish, 376 S.C. at 319, 656 S.E.2d at 
388. "The issue must be submitted to the jury whenever there is material evidence 
tending to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror."  Id.  "Yet, this rule 
does not authorize submission of speculative, theoretical, and hypothetical views to 
the jury." Id. at 319-20, 656 S.E.2d at 388.   
The court must determine whether any evidence existed on each element of the 
cause of action. Phelps, 299 S.C. at 446, 385 S.E.2d at 824. "If the evidence as a 
whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created 
and the motion should be denied." Martasin, 364 S.C. at 437, 613 S.E.2d at 799. 
However, "[a] directed verdict should be granted where the evidence raises no 
issue for the jury as to the defendant's liability."  Guffey, 364 S.C. at 163, 612 
S.E.2d at 697. 
The appellate court will reverse the circuit court's ruling on a directed verdict 
motion only when no evidence supports the ruling or the ruling is controlled by an 
error of law. Law, 368 S.C. at 434-35, 629 S.E.2d at 648.  The appellate court 
must determine whether a verdict for a party opposing the motion would be 
reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his or her favor.  
Erickson, 368 S.C. at 463, 629 S.E.2d at 663.   
A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must present (1) evidence of the 
generally recognized practices and procedures that would be exercised by 
competent practitioners in a defendant doctor's field of medicine under the same or 
similar circumstances, (2) evidence that the defendant doctor departed from the 
recognized and generally accepted standards, practices, and procedures in the 
manner alleged by the plaintiff, and (3) evidence that the defendant's departure 
from the generally accepted standards and practices was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries and damages.  Hoard, 387 S.C. at 546, 694 S.E.2d at 4-5. 
Further, "unless the subject is a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff must 
use expert testimony to establish both the standard of care and the defendant's
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failure to conform to that standard."  Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 
S.C. 248, 254, 487 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1997).  If expert testimony is the only 
evidence of proximate cause, the testimony must provide a "significant causal link 
. . . rather than a tenuous and hypothetical connection."  Hoard, 387 S.C. at 546-
47, 694 S.E.2d at 5.  "When one relies solely upon the opinion of medical experts 
to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury, the 
experts must, with reasonable certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the 
injuries complained of most probably resulted from the defendant's negligence."  
Id. at 546, 694 S.E.2d at 5 (quotation marks omitted). 
However, a testifying expert is not required to use the words "most probably" for 
the evidence to meet the test.  Martasin, 364 S.C. at 438, 613 S.E.2d at 800; see 
also Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 111, 410 S.E.2d 537, 543 
(1991) ("It is sufficient that the testimony is such as to judicially impress that the 
opinion . . . represents his professional judgment as to the most likely one among 
the possible causes . . . ." (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
We find the trial court did not err in denying Dr. Law's motions for JNOV for both 
reasons because, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sean, the 
evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Dr. Law negligent in Kelly's death.   
Dr. Law had a doctor-patient relationship with Kelly—he examined her, ordered 
several tests and x-rays, diagnosed her, and made the decision to discharge her.  
The primary questions are whether (1) no evidence was presented from which a 
reasonable jury could find a breach of the standard of care that proximately caused 
her death and (2) the only reasonable inference was the Fays' failure to return to the 
emergency room when Kelly's condition deteriorated proximately caused her death 
and their degree of fault at least exceeded fifty percent.   
First, several expert medical witnesses, including Dr. Law, testified the 
combination of a fever and a kidney stone presents a urological emergency and an 
emergency room physician breaches the standard of care by failing to rule out 
infection, one symptom of which is the presence of a fever.  Additionally, Dr. Law 
even admitted a second temperature should have been taken, he did not order one, 
and he would not have released her if she had a fever.  Dr. Law suspected a kidney 
stone as early as 8:52 a.m., but Kelly's medical records do not contain a 
temperature reading after 8:06 a.m.  Furthermore, the CT scan conducted at 10:20 
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a.m. confirmed Kelly suffered from a moderately-to-severely obstructing kidney 
stone, yet again a temperature was not taken and Dr. Law did not order one taken.  
In addition, when Dr. Law spoke with Dr. Young and informed him he planned to 
discharge Kelly, he stated she was afebrile, but he did not have a current 
temperature.  
Notwithstanding Kelly's lack of other symptoms that might demonstrate a fever, 
Sean testified he did not see anyone take Kelly's temperature the entire time, 
though the record does reflect a normal temperature at 8:06 a.m., when they 
arrived. In addition, the jury could have inferred Kelly had a fever in the 
emergency room when Sean testified to her having a temperature of 101.3 degrees 
Fahrenheit approximately an hour after leaving.  Although the experts could not 
opine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Kelly had an infection when 
she left, Dr. Mike Siroky did testify she more likely than not had a fever when she 
left the Hospital.  From this, a jury could have found Dr. Law's failure to determine 
whether she had a fever before she left at least partially caused her death.  
In addition, the parties disputed whether Dr. Law informed the Fays of the urgency 
of a fever, chills, and a kidney stone and to return to the emergency room if those 
symptoms arose.  Although the discharge instructions state to return to the 
emergency room if such symptoms arise, a jury reasonably could have found they 
were ambiguous because the instructions also stated to call the emergency room.  
Concerning Dr. Law's argument that the only reasonable inference was the Fays' 
failure to return to the emergency room when Kelly's condition deteriorated 
proximately caused her death, we conclude a jury reasonably could have found the 
evidence suggested Dr. Law and the other medical professionals failed to 
sufficiently inform the Fays of the dangerousness of a fever and a kidney stone.  
For example, Dr. Law testified he instructed the Fays to return if Kelly developed a 
fever or nausea; however, he admitted he never told them it was an emergency.  It 
is true the Fays failed to return to the emergency room even though Kelly awoke 
screaming, shivering, and having chills, had a constant fever of over 101 degrees 
Fahrenheit the entire weekend after leaving the hospital, and was nauseated and 
unable to eat the majority of the weekend.  However, a jury reasonably could have 
found the Fays were less negligent given the ambiguity the discharge instructions 
created by informing the Fays to call the Hospital or to return; the factual dispute 
concerning Dr. Law's alleged verbal instructions; the fact the side effects of the 
prescribed medicine included nausea, vomiting, and fever; Dr. Law's admission he 
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never alerted them to the fact a kidney stone and a fever could be fatal; and Dr. 
Law's failure to verify Kelly did not have a fever before discharging her 
considering the significance fever has related to a kidney stone.  
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in denying Dr. Law's motion for 
JNOV because, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sean, 
evidence existed from which a jury reasonably could have found Dr. Law was 
negligent and the Fays were less than fifty-one percent negligent.  We therefore 
affirm.   
III.  Exclusion of Extra-marital Affair 
Next, Dr. Law argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Sean's extra-
marital affair. We disagree. 
The admission of evidence is within the trial court's discretion. Watson ex rel. 
Watson v. Chapman, 343 S.C. 471, 478, 540 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Ct. App. 2000).  
"The court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence will only be reversed if it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."  R & G Constr., 
Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 439, 540 S.E.2d 113, 121 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
Damages recoverable for wrongful death are those suffered by the statutory 
beneficiaries resulting from the death of the decedent, "including pecuniary loss, 
mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief, sorrow, and loss of society 
and companionship."  Ballard v. Ballard, 314 S.C. 40, 41-42, 443 S.E.2d 802, 802 
(1994); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-20 (2005).  Dr. Law contends the trial 
court erred in excluding the affair because it is relevant and probative in assessing 
the damages Sean sustained for the loss of society and companionship8 resulting 
from Kelly's death.  
Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant.  Rule 402, SCRE.  Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
8 Consortium and society or companionship are often used interchangeably.  See 
Panhorst v. Panhorst, 301 S.C. 100, 103, 390 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(defining consortium as "the conjugal society, comfort, companionship, and 
affection of each other"). 
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consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, SCRE. Relevant evidence 
nonetheless "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ."  
Rule 403, SCRE. 
South Carolina appellate courts have not previously addressed the admissibility of 
evidence of an extra-marital affair by either the decedent or the beneficiary in 
wrongful death or survival actions. Although not quite analogous, our supreme 
court has considered the admissibility of the surviving spouse's remarriage in both 
contexts. See Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 320-21, 188 S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (1972) 
(holding evidence of remarriage is improper in wrongful death action because it 
would require a speculative comparison of the merits of the first and the second 
spouse and the circumstances that led to the remarriage); Moultrie v. Med. Univ. of 
S.C., 280 S.C. 159, 162, 311 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1984) (same); Wooten v. 
Amspacher, 279 S.C. 325, 326, 307 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1983) (holding evidence of 
remarriage is improper in survival action). 
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
evidence of the extra-marital affair.  See Rawlinson Rd. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Jackson, 395 S.C. 25, 35, 716 S.E.2d 337, 343 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or 
controlled by an error of law."). Despite some ambiguity in the ruling,9 we find the 
9 The trial court stated, 
I'm going to deny the Defendants the right to bring that 
evidence in, and exclude that evidence.  I do that for this 
reason, it's clear from the opening arguments that this
case is really about liability. It's not about damages. This 
issue of an affair really goes to damages, in the Court's 
opinion, and whether or not the loss of the spouse is as 
great as one may perceive that it is. . . .  I'm just simply 
saying that that issue goes mainly to damages, not really 
to liability, but if it does go to liability, if the Defendants 
take the position that the truth of Mr. Fay and the 
reliability is directly an issue, credibility and reliability 
are directly an issue, I find under Rule 403 that that is so 
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trial court properly concluded the probative value of the evidence was substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403, SCRE, for both liability and 
damages.   
Here, Sean's affair occurred in 1999, two to three years before Kelly's death, and 
no evidence suggests more affairs occurred or were occurring at the time of her 
death. Additionally, after Sean confessed to Kelly, they remained married and 
moved to South Carolina together.  Finally, the trial court concluded the probative 
value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  See 
Busillo v. City of North Charleston, 404 S.C. 604, 610-11, 745 S.E.2d 142, 146 
(Ct. App. 2003) (noting "a trial court has particularly wide discretion in ruling on 
Rule 403 objections" and should be reversed only in exceptional circumstances).  
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
evidence of the affair. 
IV. Enrollment of Judgment 
Dr. Law contends the trial court erred in refusing to enroll the judgment using the 
jury's determination of fault and instead using joint and several liability when the 
record contains clear evidence of an agreement by the parties, Sean in particular, to 
accept an apportioned verdict.  We disagree. 
In 1988, the General Assembly enacted the South Carolina Uniform Contribution 
Among Tortfeasors Act (the Act), which provided for contribution between 
multiple tortfeasors who were jointly and severally liable for a common liability, 
abrogating the common law rule against contribution.  Vermeer Carolina's Inc. v. 
Wood/Chuck Chipper Corp., 336 S.C. 53, 68, 518 S.E.2d 301, 309 (Ct. App. 
1999); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (2005 and Supp. 2014).  In 1991, our 
supreme court abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted 
comparative fault as the tort standard, permitting a plaintiff to recover if his or her 
negligence did not exceed that of the defendant or the combined negligence of 
multiple defendants.  Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 244-45, 399 
S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991). 
prejudicial that it is inappropriate because it is of minimal 
probative value, but high prejudicial value, and thus I'm 
going to exclude it. 
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Nonetheless, the appellate courts of South Carolina have reaffirmed the 
applicability of joint and several liability among multiple tortfeasors.  Branham v. 
Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 235-36, 701 S.E.2d 5, 22-23 (2010); see also 
Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 48, 492 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1997); Am. Fed. Bank, 
FSB v. No. One Main Joint Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 175-76, 467 S.E.2d 439, 442-43 
(1996); Fernanders v. Marks Constr. of S.C., Inc., 330 S.C. 470, 475-78, 499 
S.E.2d 509, 511-13 (Ct. App. 1998).  In 2005, the General Assembly enacted an 
amendment to permit apportionment of fault among multiple tortfeasors; however, 
it did not become effective until July 1, 2005.  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-15 (Supp. 
2014) (noting the section became effective July 1, 2005).   
The trial court initially granted Dr. Law's Rule 59(e) motion in part and ordered the 
Clerk to enroll the judgment using the percentages of fault determined by the jury.  
However, after a telephone conference with all parties, the trial court vacated its 
prior order and stated: 
The Court is now aware that the previous Order was 
incorrect when it stated that the parties agreed to be 
bound by the allocation of specific percentages of 
negligence found by the jury.  The Court recognized its 
mistake after conducting a phone conference involving 
counsel for all the parties. Therefore, there was no basis 
for the Court to direct the Clerk to reform the verdict 
based upon these percentages of negligence and to enroll 
the verdict accordingly. The law in effect at the time of 
the incident that gave rise to this suit requires joint and 
several liability, and in absence of agreement to the 
contrary, this Court must follow that law.   
The trial court's final order clearly finds no agreement between the parties and 
confirms the law in effect at the time of the injury must be applied in the absence 
of an agreement. The record supports the trial court's finding, and because the 
injury occurred in 2002 before the effective date of the Act's amendment, we 
affirm the trial court's enrollment of the judgment using joint and several liability.  
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of Dr. Young's motion for a directed verdict, denial of Dr. 
Law's motion for JNOV, exclusion of the evidence of the extra-marital affair, and 
enrollment of the judgment using joint and several liability are 
AFFIRMED.
 
SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.  
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SHORT, J.:  In this appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, George 
Ferguson argues the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission 
(Appellate Panel) erred in finding he failed to carry his burden of proving (1) 
eMove, Inc. was his statutory employer; (2) he was an employee of Sean 
Unterkoefler d/b/a United Stand Moving (Unterkoefler); and (3) Unterkoefler 
employed four or more employees during the relevant period, making Unterkoefler 
an uninsured employer subject to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act 
(the Act). We affirm. 
FACTS
eMove operates an internet marketplace where individuals or businesses renting 

moving trucks can search for and hire local moving companies to assist with 

loading and/or unloading rental trucks.  eMove contracts with local moving 

companies to provide the loading and unloading services.1  eMove customers sign 

up for the moving service on its website and select the moving company of their 

choice. eMove then sends a text message to the moving company informing them 

of the customer's booking information.  After the job is completed, eMove releases 

the customer's payment for the services to the moving company, keeping fifteen 

percent of the total amount paid by the customer for its services. 

Unterkoefler2 executed a contract with eMove in March 2009 to provide moving 

help to eMove's customers.3  Unterkoefler testified he took part in a telephone 

training session with eMove and eMove gave him advice on how to keep its 

customers happy. eMove also explained what the moving companies could and 

1  On its website, U-Haul calls the subcontractor a "Moving Helper" and defines a 

"Moving Helper" as "an independent individual or company who participates in the 

Moving Help marketplace."

2  Unterkoefler did not register his business with the South Carolina Secretary of 

State or file taxes for his business.  eMove did not provide him with any tax forms, 

such as a W-2 or a 1099. Unterkoefler started the business by visiting eMove's
 
website and signing up for an account. 

3  Unterkoefler testified in his deposition he was not a subcontractor of eMove. 
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could not do, including making clear to Unterkoefler he could not have any side 
agreements or direct contact with a customer except through eMove.   
Unterkoefler provided a labor service to his customers and did not have a moving 
truck or equipment.  He used rental moving trucks, blankets, dollies, and other 
items supplied by his customers.  He also set the days and times he would perform
moving services and set his own rates, times, and coverage areas.  Unterkoefler 
operated the moving business himself, and when he could not complete the job on 
his own due to the size or having multiple jobs at the same time, he asked for help 
or gave the job to someone else.  He paid whomever he worked with per job in 
cash and did not take any money for himself unless he participated in the job.  
Ferguson testified he performed approximately ten to fifteen moving jobs between 
April/May 2010 and August 2010 and he worked with three other movers at 
various times. 
Ferguson was working part time for Unterkoefler on August 21, 2010, when he 
injured his right hand while moving a washer/dryer unit.  On August 27, 2010, 
Ferguson had surgery on his small right finger.  He did not allege an injury to his 
right shoulder until after his deposition in March 2012.   
Ferguson filed a Form 50, seeking workers' compensation benefits from the August 
21 accident.  He claimed injuries to his right hand and right arm.  He served the 
form on United Stand Moving, eMove, New Hampshire Insurance Company, and 
the South Carolina Uninsured Employers Fund (the Fund).4  eMove and New 
Hampshire Insurance Company filed a Form 51, denying all allegations made by 
Ferguson. Ferguson filed an amended Form 50, claiming injuries to his right 
shoulder, right hand, right arm, and right knee.  eMove and the Fund each filed a 
Form 51 in response.  Unterkoefler did not make a formal appearance in the case 
and did not file any pleadings; however, his deposition was taken.  
After a hearing, the single commissioner denied benefits and dismissed the case.  
The commissioner found Ferguson failed to prove he was an employee of 
4  Amerco/U-Haul, which owns eMove, is insured through the New Hampshire 
Insurance Company.  Unterkoefler is uninsured; thus, the South Carolina 
Uninsured Employers Fund was added as a party.  Unterkoefler did not purchase 
workers' compensation insurance, believing it was not required because he had less 
than three employees. 
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Unterkoefler and failed to prove eMove was his statutory employer.  Ferguson 
filed a Form 30 Notice of Appeal, and the Appellate Panel affirmed the single 
commissioner.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The determination of whether a worker is a statutory employee is jurisdictional 
and therefore the question on appeal is one of law." Harrell v. Pineland 
Plantation, Ltd., 337 S.C. 313, 320, 523 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1999).  Thus, this court 
reviews the entire record and decides the jurisdictional facts in accord with the 
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. eMove 
Ferguson argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding he failed to carry his burden 
of proving eMove was his statutory employer.  We disagree. 
The initial question is whether eMove has "owner" liability under section 42-1-400 
of the South Carolina Code (2015). If so, eMove would be deemed Ferguson's 
"statutory employer" and liable for workers' compensation.  See Parker v. Williams 
& Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65, 72, 267 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1980) (holding an owner, 
in effect, becomes the employee's statutory employer, even though in law the 
owner is not the immediate employer of the injured worker). 
Section 42-1-400 provides: 
When any person, in this section and Sections 42-1-420 
and 42-1-430 referred to as "owner," undertakes to 
perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, 
business or occupation and contracts with any other 
person (in this section and Sections 42-1-420 to 42-1-450 
referred to as "subcontractor") for the execution or 
performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole 
or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the 
owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in 
the work any compensation under this title which he
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would have been liable to pay if the workman had been 
immediately employed by him. 
This court must make two determinations in assessing whether owner workers'
compensation liability will attach to eMove.  First, eMove must qualify as a 
business under the Act. "For the purposes of workers' compensation, '[t]he test is 
not whether the employer is in business for profit, but whether the employer is in 
business at all.  If he supplies a product or service, it is immaterial what he does 
with his profits, or whether he expects or gets any profits at all.'" Harrell, 337 S.C. 
at 321, 523 S.E.2d at 770 (quoting 4 Arthur Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 
50.44(a) (1998)).
Second, Ferguson's work must have constituted part of eMove's trade, business, or 
occupation. "The activity is considered 'part of [the owner's] trade, business, or 
occupation' for purposes of the statute if it (1) is an important part of the owner's 
business or trade; (2) is a necessary, essential, and integral part of the owner's 
business; or (3) has previously been performed by the owner's employees."  
Olmstead v. Shakespeare, 354 S.C. 421, 424, 581 S.E.2d 483, 485 (2003).  "If the 
activity at issue meets even one of these three criteria, the injured employee 
qualifies as the statutory employee of 'the owner.'"  Id.  "Owners are treated as 
statutory employers in these situations because an owner should not be able to 
avoid workers' compensation liability by subcontracting out the work of their 
business." Harrell, 337 S.C. at 322, 523 S.E.2d at 771.  "[A] subcontractor is an 
independent contractor contracting with the contractor to do part of the work which 
the contractor has previously agreed to perform."  Murray v. Aaron Mizell 
Trucking Co., 286 S.C. 351, 355, 334 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1985).   
Ferguson argues eMove's sole source of revenue is the fifteen percent it collects 
from the total amount paid by the customer for a moving job completed by the 
local moving company and "[i]f people like Unterkoefler and Ferguson did not do 
the moving jobs, eMove would have no revenue at all."  Ferguson asserts:
eMove knew moving jobs require at least a two-person 
crew. Even if one member of the crew was an 
independent contractor, eMove knew the other was 
certainly an employee.  eMove also knew that many, if 
not most, of its subcontractors were too small to require 
workers' compensation insurance.  eMove cannot claim
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ignorance of the risks faced by the downstream 
employees engaged in a very physical, dangerous job.  
Indeed, its contract seems knowingly designed to 
circumvent statutory employer liability.
eMove asserts the Appellate Panel properly relied on Murray. In Murray, this 
court held a trucker, who was injured while hauling lumber from a work site of a 
contract logger to a lumber manufacturer's plant, was the statutory employee of the 
contract logger rather than the lumber manufacturer because of the implied 
contract between the contract hauler and the contract logger whereby the contract 
hauler would transport lumber for the contract logger when needed.  Id. at 356-57,
334 S.E.2d at 131. Further, eMove maintains unlike in Murray, Unterkoefler was
not obligated to perform any work for eMove and was only obligated to perform
jobs for customers that selected his company and scheduled an appointment for his 
services. Additionally, it argues the record contains no evidence to support 
Ferguson's assertion that eMove's marketplace fee is its sole source of revenue. 
eMove contends it is not in the business of moving and eMove merely provides a 
service or marketplace in which U-Haul truck renters and movers can meet to 
assist with moving help.  The Appellate Panel found the actual moving was not a 
part of eMove's trade, business, or occupation and eMove's business was to match 
U-Haul renters with moving help.  The Appellate Panel further found Ferguson 
presented no evidence eMove contracted with anyone to move or engaged in any 
moving itself.  Therefore, the Appellate Panel found Ferguson failed to prove 
eMove was his statutory employer. 
Based on our review of the record, we find the Appellate Panel correctly found 
eMove was not Ferguson's statutory employer.  While eMove does rely on the 
movers to receive fifteen percent of the total amount paid by the customer for the 
local mover's services, eMove is not a moving company.  eMove's business or 
trade is to create a marketplace where U-Haul renters can meet movers.     
II. Unterkoefler 
Ferguson argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding he failed to carry his burden 
of proving he was an employee of Unterkoefler.  We disagree. 
Section 42-1-130 of the South Carolina Code (2015) defines an "employee" as: 
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[E]very person engaged in an employment under any 
appointment, contract of hire, or apprenticeship, 
expressed or implied, oral or written, including aliens and 
also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
employed, but excludes a person whose employment is 
both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, 
profession, or occupation of his employer . . . . 
 
Section 42-1-360 of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides the Workers' 
Compensation Law does not apply to: 
 
(1) a casual employee, as defined in Section 42-1-130; 
or 
 
(2) any person who has regularly employed in service 
less than four employees in the same business within the 
State or who had a total annual payroll during the 
previous calendar year of less than three thousand dollars 
regardless of the number of persons employed during that 
period. 
 
Thus, Ferguson must prove he was an employee of Unterkoefler and Unterkoefler 
regularly employed four or more employees.  "Under settled law, the determination 
of whether a claimant is an employee or independent contractor focuses on the 
issue of control, specifically whether the purported employer had the right to 
control the claimant in the performance of his work."  Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson 
v. Palmetto State Transp. Co., 382 S.C. 295, 299, 676 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2009).  "In 
evaluating the right of control, the Court examines four factors which serve as a 
means of analyzing the work relationship as a whole: (1) direct evidence of the 
right or exercise of control; (2) furnishing of equipment; (3) method of payment; 
(4) right to fire." Id. 
 
At the hearing before the Commissioner, the Fund contended Ferguson was not an 
employee of Unterkoefler and, in the alternative, Unterkoefler subcontracted the 
jobs from eMove to Ferguson.  The Commissioner found Ferguson failed to prove 
he was an employee of Unterkoefler. 
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Considering the first of the four factors of control, the right to control, Ferguson 
worked for Unterkoefler part time and helped him load and unload trucks rented by 
customers of Unterkoefler. In the few jobs Ferguson completed for Unterkoefler 
on his own, like the one when he was injured, Unterkoefler did not exercise control 
over the work he performed.  Unterkoefler merely gave Ferguson the customer's
information. The customer dictated the date, time, and location of the job.  When 
the job was completed, Unterkoefler gave Ferguson cash for the entire cost of the 
job. Unterkoefler testified he did not financially benefit from a job completed by 
Ferguson unless he performed the job with Ferguson.  
Regarding the furnishing of equipment, Unterkoefler provided a labor service to 
his customers. He did not have his own moving truck or equipment, and he used 
the truck his customers rented and any equipment that came with their rental truck.  
He did not have a uniform for himself or anyone who helped him.  He and his 
helpers also used their own transportation to travel to and from the customer's 
residence. 
Concerning the method of payment, Unterkoefler was paid by the job and split his 
earnings with the number of helpers he had during the job, paying them in cash.  
Finally, as to the right to fire, Unterkoefler could choose to use someone other than 
Ferguson for a job. Ferguson could also decline or refuse to perform a job.  There 
was no set schedule, and Ferguson did not work on a consistent basis.      
Therefore, after reviewing the evidence, we find the Appellate Panel correctly 
found Unterkoelfer was not Ferguson's employer.   
III. Uninsured Employer 
Ferguson argues the Appellate Panel erred in finding he failed to carry his burden 
of proving Unterkoefler employed four or more employees during the relevant 
period, making Unterkoefler an uninsured employer subject to the Act.  We 
disagree. 
Section 42-1-360(2) provides the Workers' Compensation Law does not apply to 
any person who has regularly employed in service less 
than four employees in the same business within the State 
or who had a total annual payroll during the previous 
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calendar year of less than three thousand dollars 
regardless of the number of persons employed during that 
period.
"Regularly employed" has been defined by this court as "employment of the same 
number of persons throughout the period with some constancy."  Hernandez-
Zuniga v. Tickle, 374 S.C. 235, 257, 647 S.E.2d 691, 702 (Ct. App. 2007).   
"Where employment cannot be characterized as permanent or periodically regular, 
but occurs by chance, or with the intention and understanding on the part of both 
employer and employee that it shall not be continuous, it is casual."  Hernandez-
Zuniga, 374 S.C. at 248, 647 S.E.2d at 697-98.  In determining the relevant time 
period, the Commission should consider "(1) the employer's established mode of 
operation; (2) whether the employer generally employs the jurisdictional number at 
any time during his operation, and (3) the period during which employment is 
definite and recurrent rather than occasional, sporadic, or indefinite."  Id. at 257, 
647 S.E.2d at 702. 
Ferguson asserts the relevant time period in this case was the period during July
and August 2010 when he was working with Unterkoefler with regularity.  During 
July and August, Ferguson testified he worked as many as five jobs a week.  He 
also testified he worked with three other movers at various times.  Ferguson agreed 
he would defer to Unterkoefler's testimony on whether Unterkoefler had any 
employees.  Unterkoefler testified he did not have any employees.  He stated, "I 
pretty much operated myself . . . I had some friends here and there, but no one in 
particular person for a certain – for a long, lengthy time.  It was kind of just based 
on when I got the work I found someone to help me."  He further testified that at 
any given time, the most people doing a job were himself and three helpers.   
The Appellate Panel found Ferguson failed to prove Unterkoefler regularly 
employed four or more employees, and therefore, he was not subject to the Act.  
After reviewing the evidence, we conclude Unterkoefler regularly employed less 
than four workers during the identified relevant time period.  Thus, Unterkoefler 
was exempt from the Act when Ferguson sustained his injury, and the Appellate 
Panel did not have jurisdiction to consider his claim.   
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the decision of the Appellate Panel is  
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AFFIRMED. 

HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, J.:  In this appeal from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina 
Workers' Compensation Commission, Henton Clemmons contends the Appellate 
Panel erred in (1) proceeding with a hearing to determine his permanent disability 
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award over his objection, (2) not finding him permanently and totally disabled due 
to a compensable work-related back injury, (3) not making a separate award for 
myelopathy as a neurological injury, (4) not making a separate award for a low 
back injury, and (5) assigning great weight to the medical opinion of his authorized 
treating physician. We affirm.     
FACTS
Clemmons works for Lowe's Home Centers as a cashier.  On September 12, 2010, 
he entered a trailer at the store where he worked and slipped on wet straw, landing 
on his back, neck, and head.  Clemmons was originally treated by Doctor's Care 
after he complained of low back pain radiating to his legs.  Initial medical 
examinations diagnosed him with back strain, radiculopathy,1 and right knee strain. 
After Clemmons's condition deteriorated, he was referred to Dr. Thomas Armsey 
of Midlands Orthopedics for further evaluation and treatment.
On November 1, 2010, Dr. Armsey's examination revealed acute ataxia.2  In his 
report, Dr. Armsey recorded: 
Clemmons and his mother report that he was a perfectly 
functional 38-year-old male until his work-related 
accident. Since that time his gait has been severely 
ataxic, he cannot dress because of poor balance, [and] has 
been bed ridden because of his inability to ambulate.  He 
has had multiple falls because of his poor balance which 
is all reported as beginning September 12, 2010.  He has 
had ventricular shunts3 placed as a child. . . . 
I am concerned about a brainstem or cerebellar lesion, 
possibly complications from his intraventricular shunts 
1 Radiculopathy is a "[d]isease of the spinal nerve roots."  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 1187 (24th ed. 1982).     
2 Ataxia is defined as "an ability to coordinate the muscles in the execution of 
voluntary movement."  Stedman's, supra, at 135.
3 Clemmons suffers from hydrocephalus—"[a] condition marked by an excessive 
accumulation of fluid dilating the cerebral ventricles, thinning the brain, and 
causing a separation of cranial bones." Stedman's, supra, at 663. 
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with his recent trauma.  I am certain that his ataxia is not 
coming from his lumbar spine and his right knee has no 
mechanical abnormalities on clinical exam and therefore 
his sensation of instability is likely neurologic at the knee 
as well. I would recommend an immediate neurology or 
neurosurgery referral. He is essentially wheelchair 
bound [] and will not return to work until cleared by a 
neurosurgeon/neurologist.
Dr. Armsey referred Clemmons to Dr. Randall Drye, a neurosurgeon.  A 
neurologic examination revealed Clemmons had normal strength and reflexes, but 
an MRI showed spinal cord compression from disk herniation.  Dr. Drye diagnosed 
Clemmons with "herniated nucleus pulposus [(herniated disc)] with cord 
compression and severe myelopathy,4 C5 and C7."
On November 9, 2010, Clemmons underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and 
fusion of C5 and C7.  After the surgery, Clemmons returned to the hospital 
complaining of poor sensation and control of his legs, and he was transferred to 
HealthSouth rehabilitation facility. By November 24, 2010, Clemmons had 
recovered 90% of normal sensation in his legs with only mild spasticity and 
reported no issues with pain. In a November 30, 2010 report, Dr. Drye stated: 
When we met in the office initially and we garnered his 
history he clearly reported no prior history of significant 
neck or neurologic problems prior to a fall at work.  This 
occurred, according to the patient, on 9/12/10 when he
slipped on some straw in a trailer and impacted on his 
back and the back of his head.  This mechanism of injury 
is completely consistent as the force and flexion of the 
head and neck can result in a tear in the vulnerable disc 
and subsequent herniation. . . .  Clemmons'[s] condition 
was perhaps worsened by the fact that he has congenital 
stenosis of the spine but again by history, he reports no 
prior symptoms of radicular nature or spinal cord 
4 Myelopathy is defined as a "[d]isturbance or disease of the spinal cord."  
Stedman's, supra, at 918.     
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dysfunction. For that reason, I believe that within a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, his disc 
herniations, spinal cord impingement and subsequent 
myelopathy as well as the intervening surgery were a 
direct result of his fall at work. 
Following his inpatient rehabilitation, Clemmons continued with outpatient 
physical therapy. After completing physical therapy, Clemmons had "regained 
relatively normal function in the upper extremities with no major complaints of 
numbness, tingling or weakness"; however, mild residual spasticity affected his 
gait and balance. 
On November 30, 2010, Clemmons filed a Form 50, alleging he sustained an 
injury to his "head, back[,] and legs" as a result of the work-related accident.  
Lowe's admitted Clemmons sustained a work-related injury to his low back and 
right knee and agreed to pay Clemmons temporary total disability benefits from the 
date of the accident until properly terminated.  Lowe's, however, denied Clemmons 
suffered an injury to his head or left lower extremity and further denied the extent 
of Clemmons's injuries.  
On February 2, 2011, the parties entered a consent order in which Lowe's agreed to 
accept the back, neck, and right knee as compensable injuries.  Lowe's also agreed 
to pay Clemmons temporary total disability benefits from the date of the accident 
until properly terminated due to a finding of maximum medical improvement 
(MMI), a return to work, or agreement of the parties.   
On June 7, 2011, Dr. Drye concluded Clemmons had reached MMI, assigning a 
25% whole person impairment "based on [his] injury to the cervical spine 
including a subsequent fusion and mild myelopathic residual symptoms."  
Thereafter, Lowe's asked Clemmons to provide a settlement demand pertaining to 
permanent disability.  On September 22, 2011, Clemmons signed a Form 17, 
indicating he had returned to work with restrictions but at a salary not less than 
before the injury. He accepted a position with Lowe's as a cashier with 
accommodations allowing him to sit and request assistance as needed.   
On January 4, 2012, Lowe's filed a Form 21 requesting a hearing to determine any 
compensation due for permanent total disability or permanent partial disability and 
requesting credit for overpayment of temporary benefits.  In response to 
Clemmons's request for an additional medical evaluation, Lowe's withdrew its 
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Form 21 request in order to provide for another evaluation from Clemmons's
treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Drye. 
On June 18, 2012, Dr. Drye examined Clemmons and reviewed recently performed 
magnetic imaging studies of Clemmons's lumbar spine and neck.  Clemmons 
reported neck and back stiffness and pain experienced in the morning, which 
improved as he moved about.  Dr. Drye characterized this pain as "axial," 
"myofascial," and suggestive of "arthritic-type symptoms."  Dr. Drye noted 
Clemmons had gained considerable weight and advised him that losing weight 
would likely help reduce his back pain. Dr. Drye stated Clemmons "denies any 
radicular symptoms down the leg and continues to have some altered gait from his 
previous myelopathy as well as a long-standing, pre-injury inversion to his right 
foot and ankle." Dr. Drye concluded Clemmons had reached MMI and reaffirmed 
his earlier impairment rating of 25% whole person to the back.   
Thereafter, Lowe's requested Clemmons "provide . . . a settlement demand at [his] 
earliest convenience." After it received no settlement demand, Lowe's filed 
another Form 21 request for overpayment of temporary benefits and to determine 
any permanent disability it owed Clemmons.   
On September 5, 2012, Clemmons saw Dr. Howard Mandell, a neurologist, for an 
independent medical evaluation. Dr. Mandell noted Clemmons's "symptoms are 
stable now, not improving and not worsening for the past several months at least."  
Dr. Mandell concluded Clemmons did not "require additional treatment concerning 
his injuries other than perhaps ongoing physical therapy for balance and gait."  Dr. 
Mandell also concluded there was "no indication" that Clemmons required further 
surgery. Finally, Dr. Mandell observed that Clemmons "still has spasticity in his 
legs, hyperreflexia, difficulty with coordination, inability to run[,] and difficulty 
with balance. I would say he is probably 85% better but still has this 15% 
neurological injury left over." 
On September 6, 2012, Clemmons saw Dr. Leonard Forrest of the Southeastern 
Spine Institute for another independent medical evaluation.  Dr. Forrest noted 
Clemmons's hydrocephalus "[has] left him with some cognitive deficits, but overall 
otherwise he was doing physically well until [his work-related injury]."  Dr. 
Forrest stated Clemmons had reached MMI and agreed with a twenty-five pound 
lifting restriction. Dr. Forrest assigned him a 30% permanent impairment rating 
for his neck and 10% for his "low-back related symptoms and problems[,]" 
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resulting in a permanent impairment rating of "at least 40%."  Dr. Forrest 
concluded Clemmons's loss of function to his back "would be over 50%." 
On September 11, 2012, Clemmons saw physical therapist, Tracy Hill, for a 
functional capacity evaluation. According to Hill, Clemmons qualified for a whole 
person impairment rating of 28%, "which convert[ed] to a 80% cervical spine 
impairment."  She found that he also qualified for a whole person impairment 
rating of 8%, "which convert[ed] to a 11% lumbar spine impairment." 
Also on September 11, 2012, Clemmons received another independent medical 
evaluation by Dr. Gal Margalit of Sunset Family Practice.  Dr. Margalit concurred 
with Dr. Drye's opinions concerning continuing work restrictions and weight loss.  
Dr. Margalit, however, disagreed with Dr. Drye's impairment rating, stating 
Clemmons "lost more than 50% of the functional capacity of his back."     
On September 13, 2012, Clemmons received a vocational assessment by Harriet 
Fowler. Fowler noted Clemmons was currently working at Lowe's in a light duty 
job in a satisfactory manner and had experienced no wage loss as a result of his 
injury. She stated that due to his condition, Clemmons was restricted from the 
medium, heavy, and very heavy categories of work and "technically from the light 
category-although obviously he is performing a light duty job, apparently 
satisfactorily." Fowler concluded Clemmons had experienced a 99.94% loss of 
access to the job market; however, she further stated his loss of access to the job 
market would be 76%, assuming he could perform light duty work.  She advised 
that light duty labor may not be sustainable for Clemmons over a long period, and 
therefore, working at a sedentary level may provide a better chance for sustainable 
employment.   
On September 25, 2012, the single commissioner held a hearing to determine the 
issues raised in the Form 21 filed by Lowe's.  Clemmons argued the hearing on the 
Form 21 request for a determination of permanent disability benefits violated due 
process because he had a right to request compensation at a time of his choosing.  
Clemmons further asserted that he had not reached MMI and was entitled to a 
second opinion regarding his back and neurological dysfunction.  Alternatively, he 
argued that if the single commissioner found he had reached MMI, then he was 
entitled to permanent total disability due to either (1) a 50% or more loss of use of 
the back under subsection 42-9-30(21) of the South Carolina Code (2015) or (2) 
loss of earning capacity under section 42-9-10 of the South Carolina Code (2015).  
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 Lowe's asserted Clemmons had reached MMI, that a second opinion was 
unnecessary in light of the additional evaluation by his treating physician, and that 
Clemmons was not entitled to permanent total disability under subsection 42-9-
30(21) or section 42-9-10. 
 
The single commissioner found Clemmons sustained a 48% permanent partial 
disability to his back under section 42-9-30, which included "any radicular 
symptoms to his right leg."  The single commissioner also found Clemmons was 
not entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to section 42-9-10 because he 
had returned to work for almost two years.  Clemmons appealed to the Appellate 
Panel, which affirmed the single commissioner's order in its entirety.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
"The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides the standard for judicial 
review of decisions by the [Appellate Panel]."  Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 
S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010).  "[An appellate] court can reverse or 
modify the [Appellate Panel]'s decision if it is affected by an error of law or is 
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the 
whole record." Id. "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but 
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds 
to reach the conclusion the agency reached."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The possibility of drawing two different conclusions from the evidence 
does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence.  Hall v. 
Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 348, 656 S.E.2d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 2007).   
 
"Where there are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the 
[Appellate Panel] are conclusive."  Hall v. United Rentals, Inc., 371 S.C. 69, 80, 
636 S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2006).  "The [Appellate Panel] is the ultimate fact 
finder in [w]orkers' [c]ompensation cases . . . ."  Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 
S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004).  The final determination of 
witness credibility and the weight of the evidence is for the Appellate Panel.  Id. 
"Where the medical evidence conflicts, the findings of fact of the [Appellate Panel] 
are conclusive." Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 318 S.C. 431, 435, 458 
S.E.2d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
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I. Form 21 Request for Hearing  
A. Due Process 
Clemmons argues the Appellate Panel violated his substantive and procedural due 
process rights to request a hearing for a determination of his permanent disability 
award at a time of his choosing. According to Clemmons, only he "has the right to 
bring a cause of action for a determination of [permanent disability] benefits and it 
is a denial of due process to force [him] to a premature determination of those 
benefits where he has not made a request that he be awarded any benefits 
whatsoever under the [Workers' Compensation] Act (the Act)."  We disagree. 
To establish a procedural due process claim, a person must show deprivation of his 
liberty or property interests due to the government's failure to provide notice, an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, or judicial review.  Harbit v. City of 
Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 393, 675 S.E.2d 776, 781 (Ct. App. 2009).  This court 
previously has identified "adequate notice," "adequate opportunity for a hearing," 
"the right to introduce evidence," and "the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses" as the minimal due process requirements in a contested case proceeding 
such as a workers' compensation hearing.  Adams v. H.R. Allen, Inc., 397 S.C. 652, 
657, 726 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Clemmons has failed to show a procedural due process violation.  The Commission 
held hearings to determine Clemmons's permanent disability benefits after notice 
was provided to both parties.  At the hearings, Clemmons had the right to call any 
witness, cross-examine all adverse witnesses, and was allowed to present any 
admissible evidence to support his claim.  Clemmons's primary complaint with the 
Commission proceeding with a hearing at this time appears to be that he was 
entitled to a "second opinion" regarding the extent of his impairment; however, 
after Dr. Drye assigned Clemmons an impairment rating of 25% whole person to 
the back, Clemmons received evaluations from Dr. Forrest, Dr. Mandell, Dr. 
Margalit, Hill, and Fowler, which the Commission considered in deciding his 
permanent disability benefits. Accordingly, the procedure employed by the 
Commission comported with due process.     
B. Authority to Hear Claim 
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Clemmons next argues the Commission lacked statutory authority and jurisdiction 
to hold a hearing to determine his permanent disability benefits because he did not 
request a hearing to determine those benefits.  He asserts that under subsection 42-
9-260(E) of the South Carolina Code (2015), "An employer may request a hearing 
at any time to address termination or reduction of temporary disability payments"; 
however, the Act does not allow an employer to request a hearing to pay 
permanent disability benefits. (emphasis added).  We disagree. 
Section 42-17-20 of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides:  
If the employer and the injured employee or his 
dependents fail to reach an agreement in regard to 
compensation under this title within fourteen days after 
the employer has knowledge of the injury . . . either party 
may make application to the [C]ommission for a hearing 
in regard to the matters at issue and for a ruling thereon.  
In McMillan v. Midlands Human Resources, this court held an employer has a 
statutory right under section 42-17-20 to request a hearing when it has knowledge 
of an injury for more than fourteen days, and the parties fail to reach an agreement 
for compensation.  305 S.C. 532, 534, 409 S.E.2d 443, 444 (Ct. App. 1991).  
The Commission did not err in proceeding with a hearing to determine Clemmons's 
permanent disability award. Clemmons's injury occurred on September 12, 2010.  
On September 16, 2011, and July 24, 2012, Lowe's asked Clemmons for a 
settlement agreement for permanent disability compensation and received no 
settlement offer.  Because fourteen days had passed since Clemmons's injury and 
the parties failed to reach an agreement as to an award for permanent disability, 
Lowe's had the right to request a hearing to determine compensation for any 
permanent disability, and the Commission was authorized to act on the request for 
a hearing under section 42-17-20. 
Clemmons relies on South Carolina Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty 
Association v. Carolinas Roofing & Sheet Metal Contractor's Self-Insurers Fund, 
303 S.C. 368, 401 S.E.2d 144 (1991) as support for his argument that the 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine an employee's permanent disability 
benefits when the employee does not request the hearing to determine permanent 
disability benefits. We disagree. 
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In Carolinas Roofing, the employee entered into a settlement agreement with his 
employer and its workers' compensation carrier that fully satisfied all liability 
under the Act. Id. at 370, 401 S.E.2d at 145. The employer's carrier became 
insolvent, making the South Carolina Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty 
Association (Guaranty Association) responsible for providing coverage.  Id. The 
Guaranty Association declined to pay the claim and filed a declaratory judgment in 
the circuit court seeking to determine its liability for the claim.  Id. The 
respondents moved to dismiss the action, alleging the Commission had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the action. Id.  The circuit court held the Commission had 
exclusive jurisdiction and entered a judgment in favor of the respondents.  Id. On 
appeal, the issue before our supreme court was "whether there was a pending 
employee claim for compensation before the Commission at the time the action 
was commenced in circuit court."  Id. at 371, 401 S.E.2d at 145.  The supreme 
court held the settlement agreement terminated the employee's pending claim 
before the Commission; therefore, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide 
the issue raised by the Guaranty Association.  Id. at 371-372, 401 S.E.2d at 146. 
 
Unlike Carolinas Roofing, a "pending employee claim for compensation" existed 
here because Clemmons's claim for workers' compensation benefits had not been 
decided when Lowe's requested a hearing to determine the permanent disability 
award. Moreover, Clemmons and Lowe's never entered a settlement agreement to 
resolve any liability that existed under the Act.  Therefore, the Commission had 
jurisdiction to hold a hearing upon Lowe's request to determine whether Clemmons 
was entitled to permanent disability benefits.   
 
II. Permanent Total Disability     
 
A. 50% or more loss of use of back 
 
Clemmons next argues the Appellate Panel erred in not finding him permanently 
and totally disabled due to 50% or more loss of use of the back.  He contends he 
met his burden of proving he sustained 50% or more loss of use to his back, and 
Lowe's failed to rebut the presumption, thereby making him entitled to permanent 
total disability under section 42-9-30.  We disagree. 
 
"[I]n cases where there is fifty percent or more loss of use of the back the injured 
employee shall be presumed to have suffered total and permanent disability and 
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compensated under [s]ection 42-9-10(B)."  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-30(21) (2015).  
This presumption is rebuttable.  Id.
"To qualify for total and permanent disability, a claimant must suffer a 50% or 
greater loss of use of his back." Clark v. Aiken Cnty. Gov't, 366 S.C. 102, 115, 620 
S.E.2d 99, 105 (Ct. App. 2005).  "The [Appellate Panel]'s finding as to the degree 
of impairment is a question of fact."  Id.  "[T]he determination of an injured 
employee's impairment rating is more art than science, involving the consideration 
of evidence the [Appellate Panel] may gather from the injured employee, medical 
and vocational experts, and lay witnesses[.]"  Burnette v. City of Greenville, 401 
S.C. 417, 429, 737 S.E.2d 200, 206-07 (Ct. App. 2012).  "While an impairment 
rating may not rest on surmise, speculation or conjecture . . . it is not necessary that 
the percentage of disability or loss of use be shown with mathematical exactness."  
Fishburne v. ATI Sys. Int'l, 384 S.C. 76, 86, 681 S.E.2d 595, 600 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "The Appellate Panel is 
not bound by the opinion of medical experts and may find a degree of disability 
different from that suggested by expert testimony."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
Substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's finding that Clemmons was not 
entitled to permanent total disability under section 42-9-30 due to 50% or more 
loss of use of his back.  After considering "the medical evidence as a whole," the 
Appellate Panel determined Clemmons sustained a 48% permanent partial 
disability to the back. In making this finding, the Appellate Panel relied on the 
medical reports of Dr. Drye who assigned Clemmons a 25% whole person 
impairment rating "based on his injury to the cervical spine including a subsequent 
fusion and mild myelopathic residue symptoms."  Dr. Drye noted Clemmons's
stiffness and pain in his back was "strongly suggestive of arthritic-type symptoms," 
and advised Clemmons that continued stretching exercises as well as weight loss 
would help with his lumbar symptoms.  Admittedly, Clemmons presented medical 
evidence that supported an award of 50% or more loss of use to the back.  
Specifically, Dr. Forrest opined that Clemmons's loss of function to his back 
"would be over 50%." Likewise, Dr. Margalit stated Clemmons "lost more than 
50% of the functional capacity of his back."  Nevertheless, after considering all the 
medical evidence, the Appellate Panel chose to place more weight on Dr. Drye's
reports, which was in its discretion as the factfinder.  Although the Appellate Panel 
could have reasonably concluded Clemmons's loss of use to the back was 50% or 
more, "where the medical evidence conflicts, the findings of fact of the [Appellate 
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Panel] are conclusive."  Mullinax, 318 S.C. at 435, 458 S.E.2d at 78; see also 
Harbin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 316 S.C. 423, 427, 450 S.E.2d 112, 114 (Ct. 
App. 1994) ("The existence of any conflicting opinions between the doctors is a 
matter left to the [Appellate Panel].").  Because substantial evidence supports the 
Appellate Panel's finding that Clemmons suffered a 48% permanent partial 
disability to the back, we affirm as to this issue.5 
B. Wage Loss 
Clemmons next argues the Appellate Panel erred in considering wage loss in 
deciding whether he suffered 50% or more loss of use of his back.  We disagree. 
"While [permanent total disability] is generally based on loss of earning capacity, 
[sub]section 42-9-30(21) states there is a rebuttable presumption of [permanent 
total disability] when a claimant has 50% or more loss of use of the back."  Watson 
v. Xtra Mile Driver Training, Inc., 399 S.C. 455, 464, 732 S.E.2d 190, 195 (Ct. 
App. 2012). "Therefore, a claimant with 50% or more loss of use of the back is not 
required to prove loss of earning capacity to establish [permanent total disability]."  
Id.
The Appellate Panel addressed whether Clemmons was entitled to permanent total 
disability under sections 42-9-30 and 42-9-10.  It first found Clemmons was not 
entitled to permanent total disability under subsection 42-9-30(21) because his loss 
of use of the back was 48%. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-30(21) (stating a claimant 
with 50% or more loss of use of the back is presumed to be permanently and 
totally disabled). The Appellate Panel then found Clemmons was not entitled to 
permanent total disability under section 42-9-10 because he had returned to work 
5 At oral argument, Clemmons contended the Appellate Panel erred in its award 
because all the medical evidence established his loss of use of the back was over 
50%. Specifically, Clemmons pointed out subsection 42-9-30(21) addresses "loss 
of use" of the back, not "impairment" or "disability" and Dr. Drye's records do not 
support the Appellate Panel's finding of 48% permanent partial disability because 
they only addressed Clemmons's impairment rating. We disagree. Although Dr. 
Drye's records do not use the language "loss of use" of the back, we believe his 
25% impairment rating provides substantial evidence to support the Appellate 
Panel's determination that Clemmons's loss of use of the back was not 50% or 
more.   
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for almost two years.  Contrary to Clemmons's argument, the Appellate Panel 
considered loss of earning capacity when it addressed permanent total disability 
under section 42-9-10, not section 42-9-30.  We find no error in the Appellate 
Panel's analysis because loss of earning capacity is generally a prerequisite to a 
finding of permanent total disability under section 42-9-10.  See Skinner v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 394 S.C. 428, 433, 716 S.E.2d 443, 445-46 (2011) ("It 
is well-settled that an award under [section 42-9-10] must be predicated upon a 
showing of a loss of earning capacity . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Because Clemmons returned to work in a job similar to that which he had prior to
the accident making the same salary, the Appellate Panel did not err in finding he 
was not entitled to permanent total disability under section 42-9-10.  See Watson, 
399 S.C. at 462-63, 732 S.E.2d at 194-95 (noting an employee was not entitled to 
permanent total disability under section 42-9-10 when there was evidence she 
"could return to work in an occupation that complied with her job factor 
restrictions"). Finally, Clemmons argues that even if loss of earning capacity is a 
proper consideration in deciding permanent total disability under section 42-9-30, 
substantial evidence indicates he is permanently and totally disabled because his 
vocational evaluation determined he was excluded from more than 99% of the job 
market in the United States.  Clemmons's argument erroneously attempts to infuse 
loss of earning capacity into the analysis of permanent total disability under section 
42-9-30. Although Clemmons's exclusion from the job market would be an 
appropriate consideration when deciding permanent total disability under section 
42-9-10, it is irrelevant under section 42-9-30.  See Watson, 399 S.C. at 464, 732 
S.E.2d at 195. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Panel as to this issue.   
III. Myelopathy 
Clemmons next argues the Appellate Panel erred in not making an award for 
myelopathy as a separate neurological injury.  We disagree. 
The Appellate Panel found "[Clemmons]'s permanent partial disability includes 
any radicular symptoms to his right leg."  This finding was based on Dr. Drye's
conclusion that Clemmons suffered a 25% whole person impairment "based on 
[his] injury to the cervical spine including a subsequent fusion and mild 
myelopathic residual symptoms."  Thus, the Appellate Panel included residual 
myelopathy in its permanent partial disability award to the back, and it 
consequently rejected Clemmons's claim for a neurological award for myelopathy.  
We believe substantial evidence supports this finding.  Although Dr. Mandell 
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observed that Clemmons "is probably 85% better but still has this 15% 
neurological injury left over," we do not believe he was assigning an impairment 
rating for myelopathy as a neurological injury; rather, he was explaining 
Clemmons had not recovered 100% of his pre-injury functioning.  Furthermore, 
Dr. Drye noted Clemmons continued to have altered gait from his previous 
myelopathy; however, Dr. Drye did not offer a separate impairment rating for 
myelopathy and opined that Clemmons's current symptoms were consistent with 
"axial and myofascial pain and strongly suggestive of arthritic type symptoms."  
Accordingly, the Appellate Panel did not err in deciding not to make an award for 
myelopathy as a separate neurological injury.      
IV. Low Back Injury 
Clemmons next argues the Appellate Panel erred in not making a separate award 
for his low back injury. Specifically, he asserts that he presented substantial 
evidence showing he sustained an additional injury to his "low back" that was 
separate and distinct from the injury to his back.  We disagree. 
The Appellate Panel's finding that Clemmons sustained a 48% permanent partial 
disability to the back under subsection 42-9-30(21) included any impairment to the 
low back. See Lyles v. Quantum Chem. Co. (Emery), 315 S.C. 440, 443, 446, 434 
S.E.2d 292, 294-95 (Ct. App. 1993) (analyzing an injury to "the low back" under 
subsection 42-9-30(21)). Subsection 42-9-30(21) addresses "the loss of use of the 
back"; however, the term "back" is not defined in the Act.  "In construing a statute, 
courts should give words their plain and ordinary meaning and should not resort to
subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation."  Hartford 
Acc. & Indem. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 316 S.C. 420, 422, 450 S.E.2d 110, 111 
(Ct. App. 1994) (defining the term "conceal" according to its "plain and ordinary 
meaning" when it was not defined in the Act).  Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary defines the "back" as "the rear part of the human body esp. from the 
neck to the end of the spine." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 83 (10th 
ed. 1993). Thus, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "back" includes the 
low back. Moreover, section 42-9-30 does not recognize the "low back" as a 
separate scheduled member.  Accordingly, this issue is without merit. 
V. Weight Assigned to Dr. Drye's Opinion 
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Clemmons next argues the Appellate Panel erred in assigning great weight to the 
medical opinion of Dr. Drye because it contradicted the other medical evidence.  
We disagree. 
The Appellate Panel did not err in assigning great weight to Dr. Drye's medical 
opinion.  See Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 455, 562 S.E.2d 679, 681 
(Ct. App. 2002) ("The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to 
be accorded evidence is reserved to the [Appellate Panel].").  Dr. Drye was 
Clemmons's authorized treating physician, and he treated Clemmons for over two 
years. After reviewing the medical evidence presented, the Appellate Panel 
determined Dr. Drye's medical reports "were the most persuasive."  In a November 
30, 2010 report, Dr. Drye stated Clemmons's "disc herniations, spinal cord 
impingement and subsequent myelopathy as well as the intervening surgery were a 
direct result of his fall at work."  On June 18, 2012, Dr. Drye noted Clemmons 
"denies any radicular symptoms down the leg and continues to have some altered 
gait from his previous myelopathy as well as a long-standing, pre-injury inversion 
to his right foot and ankle."  Although the June 18, 2012 report implies that 
Clemmons's myelopathy existed prior to his work-related injury, which contradicts 
the November 30, 2010 report, it was the Appellate Panel's duty as the factfinder to 
resolve this contradiction.  See Mullinax, 318 S.C. at 435, 458 S.E.2d at 78 
("Where the medical evidence conflicts, the findings of fact of the [Appellate 
Panel] are conclusive.").  Therefore, we find no error because this issue concerned 
a question of the weight assigned to the evidence.    
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Panel's decision is  
AFFIRMED.     
FEW, C.J., and McDONALD, J., concur.   
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, Beth Ann Prince (Tenant) appeals the 
master-in-equity's order awarding Bluffton Towne Center, LLC (BTC) $35,784 in
rent and late fees for Tenant's breach of a commercial lease.  Tenant argues the 
master erred in (1) finding the lease was terminated by abandonment; (2) finding 
Tenant was liable for future rents under the lease; (3) considering extrinsic 
evidence after finding the lease unambiguous; (4) not allowing Tenant to cross-
examine Paul Watson, the managing member of BTC, about specific language in 
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the subject lease and language in two subsequent leases BTC entered into with 
different parties; and (5) failing to recognize the lease was ambiguous.  We affirm
as modified. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 1, 2009, BTC entered into a commercial lease agreement with Tenant 
for office space in Bluffton, South Carolina.  Under the three-year term lease, 
Tenant was required to make monthly rental payments of $1,825 from January 1, 
2009, to December 31, 2011.  At issue in this case is the default provision of the 
lease:
DEFAULTS.  Tenant shall be in default of this Lease if 
Tenant fails to fulfill any lease obligation or term by 
which Tenant is bound. Subject to any governing 
provisions of law to the contrary, if Tenant fails to cure 
any financial obligation within 10 days (or any other 
obligation within 30 days) after written notice of such 
default is provided by [BTC] to Tenant, [BTC] may take 
possession of the Premises without further notice (to the 
extent permitted by law), and without prejudicing [its]
rights to damages.  In the alternative, [BTC] may elect to 
cure any default and the cost of such action shall be 
added to Tenant's financial obligations under this Lease.  
Tenant shall pay all costs, damages, and expenses 
(including reasonable attorney fees and expenses) 
suffered by [BTC] by reason of Tenant's defaults.  All 
sums of money or charges required to be paid by Tenant 
under this Lease shall be additional rent, whether or not 
such sums or charges are designated as "additional rent." 
On December 18, 2009, Tenant emailed Watson to inform him she was closing her 
law practice. In the email, Tenant noted she would need to stay in the space 
through the end of January and "possibly some of February."  She further stated, "I 
hope that you and I will be able to work something out amicably[] because I realize 
that the lease will not expire for another year. . . .  I will also keep my eyes and 
ears open for anyone who may want the space."  Watson responded to the email on 
the same day, stating he was not willing to forgive the remaining balance and 
assumed Tenant would honor her obligation under the lease. 
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On February 26, 2010, after Tenant defaulted on her rent payment for that month, 
Watson sent Tenant a written ten-day notice to pay or quit the premises.  The 
notice stated, "You are hereby notified that you have ten (10) days to pay to the 
undersigned office rent now due from you in the amount of $1,875.00 as set forth 
below, or your right to possession of the . . . premises will cease and you must quit 
same."  The notice further contained the following language: 
In the event you do not satisfy all the requirements of this 
ten (10) day notice by paying . . . [$1,875] and do either 
voluntarily or by court leave the premises, you will still 
be obligated and responsible for payment of monies set 
forth below, together with any additional costs, legal 
fees, expenses[,] and rents that continue to accrue under 
the terms of the lease because of non-payment. 
Tenant did not respond, and on March 28, 2010, BTC's counsel emailed Tenant 
requesting that she (1) remove all of her possessions from the space, (2) pay the 
rent due for February and March 2010, (3) continue to make monthly payments 
until the space was relet, and (4) pass along the names of any potential tenants to 
BTC's rental agent.  His email further stated if they could not reach an agreement 
along those lines, BTC would be forced to file an ejectment action and suit for 
back rent. In Tenant's email response, she explained that filing an ejectment action 
was unnecessary because she vacated the unit at the beginning of February 2010.  
Tenant further stated, "I am happy to assist in getting the place rerented, however, I 
am simply unable to pay the back rent, or else I would pay it." 
BTC subsequently retrieved the keys from Tenant in April 2010.  For the 
remainder of the lease term, BTC rented the unit to two separate tenants at reduced 
rates. In a March 9, 2012 letter, BTC's counsel informed Tenant she owed 
$34,850, but said he wanted to give her "an opportunity to try to work out a 
resolution of this matter" prior to filing an action for damages pursuant to the lease. 
After the lease term expired, BTC filed suit for damages on April 16, 2012.  The 
matter was tried before the master-in-equity for Beaufort County, South Carolina, 
on October 26, 2012.
At trial, Watson testified on behalf of BTC, and on cross-examination, Tenant 
questioned Watson regarding the sequence of events as well as the correspondence 
between the parties after Tenant defaulted under the lease.  Tenant attempted to 
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 elicit testimony from Watson regarding specific language in the subject lease.  
BTC objected to the line of questioning, arguing Tenant was improperly seeking 
Watson's legal interpretation of the lease, and the master sustained the objection.  
Tenant further tried to elicit testimony from Watson regarding language in two 
subsequent leases BTC entered into with different parties.  BTC, however, 
objected on relevance grounds, and the master sustained the objection. 
On December 26, 2012, the master issued an order granting judgment to BTC in 
the amount of $39,627.55. In his order, the master concluded the holding in Simo
v. Kirkpatrick, 141 S.C. 251, 139 S.E.2d 614 (1927)—that a lessor's termination o
the lease absolves a lessee from future obligations unless the lease provides the 
lessee is not relieved of such obligations—"does not state the modern law of 
damages for the breach of a lease in South Carolina today."  Instead, the master 
found U.S. Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956), state
the modern rule for damages a landlord may recover for a tenant's breach of the 
lease, holding Tenant was liable for future rents as damages under this rule.  The 
master concluded in the alternative that, even if Simon remains valid law, BTC wa
still entitled to recover future rents because it reserved the right to all damages in 
the default provision of the subject lease.  This appeal followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. 	 Did the master err in finding Tenant terminated the subject lease by 
abandonment? 
II. 	 Did the master err in finding that Simon is no longer valid law and, 
pursuant to the ruling in U.S. Rubber, Tenant was responsible for future 
rents as damages to BTC under the default provision in the subject lease
III. 	 Did the master err in considering extrinsic evidence after finding the 
subject lease was unambiguous? 
IV.	  Did the master err in not allowing Tenant to cross-examine Watson 
regarding language in the subject lease as well as language in two 
subsequent leases BTC entered into with different parties? 
V.	  Did the master err in failing to recognize the lease was ambiguous? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
n 
f 
s 
s 
? 
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"A lease agreement is a contract, and an action to construe a contract is an action at
law." Middleton v. Eubank, 388 S.C. 8, 14, 694 S.E.2d 31, 34 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citations omitted). "An action for breach of contract seeking money damages is 
an action at law." Sapp v. Wheeler, 402 S.C. 502, 507, 741 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. 
App. 2013) (citing Silver v. Aabstract Pools & Spas, Inc., 376 S.C. 585, 590, 658 
S.E.2d 539, 541–42 (Ct. App. 2008)).  When reviewing a master-in-equity's
judgment made in an action at law, "the appellate court will not disturb the master's 
findings of fact unless the findings are found to be without evidence reasonably 
supporting them."  Silver, 376 S.C. at 590, 658 S.E.2d at 542. Nevertheless, the 
"reviewing court is free to decide questions of law with no particular deference to 
the [master]." Id. (quoting Hunt v. S.C. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 569, 595 
S.E.2d 846, 848–49 (Ct. App. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Termination by Abandonment 
Tenant first argues the master erred in finding the subject lease was terminated by 
abandonment. According to Tenant, Watson's ten-day notice to pay or quit the 
premises was the equivalent of a termination by eviction.  We disagree. 
Any act that involves the "direct deprivation of possession" or "so affects the 
tenant's enjoyment of the premises" that the tenant relinquishes possession is an 
eviction. Thomas v. Hancock, 271 S.C. 273, 275, 246 S.E.2d 604, 605 (1978) 
(citation omitted).  The act, however, must provide the tenant with a legal 
justification for relinquishing possession.  Id. (citation omitted).  Conversely, a 
tenant's abandonment—or voluntary surrender of possession—of leased premises 
does not constitute an eviction.  See id. at 275, 246 S.E.2d at 606 (citation omitted). 
Our supreme court has held "the relationship of landlord and tenant is terminated 
where the lessor, for his own purposes, re-enters and relets the demised premises 
upon the lessee's abandonment of the property and default in the payment of the 
rent." Sur. Realty Corp. v. Asmer, 249 S.C. 114, 119, 153 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1967) 
(citing U.S. Rubber, 231 S.C. at 95, 97 S.E.2d at 409).  Nevertheless, "[w]hen a 
tenant delivers the keys of the leased premises to the landlord[,] and he receives 
them so as to be able to rent the premises for the account of the lessee, such is 
insufficient to terminate the lease or release the tenant from further liability for 
rent." Id. (citations omitted). 
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In the instant case, we find Tenant abandoned the leased premises.  In a March 28, 
2010 email, Tenant stated she had "vacated the unit at the beginning of February."  
She further explained that "[f]iling an ejectment action [was] simply unnecessary" 
because she had "been out of the unit for nearly two months, as Mr. Watson 
requested." Moreover, Tenant voluntarily surrendered possession of the premises 
by turning over the keys to BTC in April 2010.  Because Tenant returned her keys 
and admitted to voluntarily vacating the leased premises prior to the February 26, 
2010 notice to pay or quit the premises, the record simply does not support her 
argument that BTC evicted her and terminated the lease via the notice. 
Based on the foregoing, we find the master properly concluded that BTC 
terminated the subject lease upon Tenant's abandonment by reentering and reletting 
the premises. 
II. Damages Recoverable for Breach of a Commercial Lease 
Next, Tenant argues the master erred in concluding Simon is no longer valid law 
and holding U.S. Rubber states the modern rule for damages recoverable for breach 
of a lease. While we agree the master erred in concluding Simon was overruled by
U.S. Rubber, we find the master properly held BTC was entitled to recover future 
rents as damages under the theories of both Simon and U.S. Rubber. 
A. Simon Remains Valid Law 
As a preliminary matter, we find the master erred in concluding the rule set forth in 
Simon is no longer a valid statement of the law. 
In his order, the master concluded—without further explanation—that Simon is no 
longer valid and does not set forth "the modern law of damages for the breach of a 
lease in South Carolina today." The master, however, failed to cite any case in 
which a court overruled Simon or gave its ruling negative treatment.  Indeed, a 
review of the relevant case law reveals that Simon has not been overruled and, in 
fact, courts have cited its propositions with approval.  See, e.g., U.S. Rubber, 231 
S.C. at 95, 97 S.E.2d at 409 (citing Simon for the proposition that, upon the lessor's 
reentry and reletting of the premises following the lessee's abandonment of the 
property, the lessor–lessee or landlord–tenant relationship came to an end); 
Camden Inv. Co. v. Gibson, 204 S.C. 513, 518–19, 30 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1944) 
(citing Simon as outlining the proper elements of damages available for breach of a 
lease contract). 
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Therefore, contrary to the master's findings, we hold that Simon remains valid law. 
B. Liability Under Simon and U.S. Rubber
Although the master erred in concluding Simon is no longer valid law, we find he 
correctly concluded—in the alternative—that BTC was entitled to recover future 
rents under the damages term in the lease pursuant to Simon. Accordingly, we 
affirm as modified the portion of the master's order in which he analyzed the 
validity and applicability of Simon's holdings to the facts of this case. 
In Simon, the lessor entered into a three-year written contract under which he 
leased a vacant lot to the lessee. 141 S.C. at 253, 139 S.E. at 615.  The lease 
contained the following default provision:
It is agreed that if there is default in the payment of rent 
above stipulated for as much as 60 days after same is 
due, . . . [the lessor] shall have the right to re-enter and 
repossess said premises, at his option[,] and to expel and 
remove therefrom . . . [the lessee] or any other person 
occupying the same. 
Id. at 254, 139 S.E. at 615. After the lessee refused to take possession of the leased 
premises and defaulted on the payment of two months' rent, the lessor gave notice 
that he was terminating the lessee's rights under the lease and reentered the 
premises.  Id. at 261, 139 S.E. at 618. The lessor's notice stated the following:  
"You are due me two (2) months' rent at one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) each 
as of September 1, 1924, you having failed to make payment as per terms of lease, 
are thereby precluded from any further right or benefit thereunder."  Id. at 254–55,
139 S.E. at 615–16. When the lessee refused to pay the three years of rent due 
under the lease, the lessor filed an action against him for breach of contract. Id. at 
253–54, 139 S.E. at 615.
Because the lessee in Simon never took possession of the premises and notified the 
lessor he did not intend to do so, our supreme court concluded the landlord–tenant 
relationship was never consummated and the parties' relationship, instead, was that 
of lessor and lessee under a written lease contract.  Id. at 256, 139 S.E. at 616. The 
court further found it was clear that, when the lessee refused to fulfill his obligation 
under the lease by taking possession of the lot, he breached the contract and 
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became liable to the lessor for damages resulting from the breach.  Id. at 258, 139 
S.E. at 617. 
Moreover, the court stated "[t]he measure of damages is the difference between the 
rent fixed in the lease and the rental value of the premises for the entire term, at the 
time of the breach, together with such special damages as [the lessor] may prove to 
have resulted from the breach."  Id. at 259, 139 S.E. at 617. In addition to this 
option, the court stated the lessor could have waited until the term expired and, 
"upon a showing of reasonable efforts to minimize his damage, sued for the 
damage actually sustained, the agreed rental less rental which he had in the 
meantime received or with proper effort should have received."  Id.
The lessor in Simon, however, was not required to adopt any of the above-
mentioned remedies because the default provision of the lease provided for one.  
Id.  In fact, as the court noted, the lessor chose to adopt the remedy provided for in 
the lease by sending the notice, precluding the lessee from any further rights or 
benefits under the lease. Id. at 259–60, 139 S.E. at 617. Because the lessor chose 
this method, the court found it was illogical and unfair to preclude the lessee from
all rights and benefits under the lease, while simultaneously holding him liable for 
future obligations under it.  Id. at 260, 139 S.E. at 617. According to the court, the 
applicable rule provides as follows: 
[T]he termination of a lease does not absolve the lessee 
from obligations incurred up to the date of termination, 
but it does absolve him from future obligations, unless 
the lease shall provide that, notwithstanding this 
termination for cause by the lessor, the lessee shall not be 
relieved of such future obligations.  The lease in the case 
at bar does not carry a provision to the effect mentioned. 
Id. at 262, 139 S.E. at 618 (citation omitted). 
Unlike the provision at issue in Simon, the default provision in the subject lease 
expressly reserved BTC's right to recover all damages resulting from Tenant's
breach after reentering the premises.  The default provision in this case provides, in 
relevant part, that BTC "may take possession of the Premises . . . without 
prejudicing [its] rights to damages. . . .  Tenant shall pay all costs, damages, and 
expenses (including reasonable attorney fees and expenses) suffered by [BTC] by 
reason of Tenant's default." 
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More importantly, unlike Tenant in this case, the lessee in Simon never actually 
took possession of the premises prior to the lessor sending a notice terminating his 
rights under the lease.  The court in Simon was notably concerned with precluding 
the lessee from enjoying any rights and benefits under the lease, while also holding 
him responsible for the future obligations under it.  In the instant case, however, 
Tenant occupied the leased premises for several years and renewed the subject 
lease prior to defaulting on rent payment and breaching the lease.  Further, Tenant 
voluntarily abandoned the premises prior to Watson's notice to pay or quit, the 
effect of which was not to preclude her from entering the premises or exercising 
any rights or benefits under the lease. 
The court in Simon found it would be unfair to hold the lessor "to a liability against 
which he could not have protected himself" when the lessor withdrew any 
consideration for the lessee's promise to pay rent and was enjoying the premises for 
his own benefit. Id. at 260–61, 139 S.E. at 617–18. The same cannot be said for 
the instant case.  In fact, we believe it would be unfair to allow Tenant to simply 
abandon the leased premises and terminate rent payments at her own leisure— 
thereby breaching a written lease contract—without any consequence for such 
actions. In any event, we find that, under the rule in Simon, the default provision 
in the subject lease adequately provided for BTC's right to recover all damages 
upon Tenant's default in rent payments and breach of the lease. 
Likewise, in U.S. Rubber, our supreme court faced a situation in which the lessor 
terminated the lease by reentering and reletting the property after the lessee 
abandoned the premises and defaulted in the payment of rent.  231 S.C. at 95, 97 
S.E.2d at 409. Citing Simon, the court first noted that the landlord–tenant 
relationship came to an end upon termination of the lease and the tenant had no 
further obligation to the landlord for future rent thereafter.  Id. (citing Simon, 141 
S.C. at 261, 139 S.E. at 618). While the tenant no longer had an obligation for 
future rents, the court stated the tenant was still liable for damages resulting from
its breach of contract. Id.  The court explained that the measure for such damages
was "the amount [the landlord] would have received as rent for the remainder of 
the term, had there been no default, less such amount as [it] may receive from the 
new tenant" because it was the landlord's duty to minimize any damages.  Id.
(citation omitted).   
After a thorough review of the case law, we agree with BTC's contention that the 
above statement in U.S. Rubber is more reflective of the modern rule for damages 
recoverable upon the breach of a lease. In concluding the landlord was entitled to 
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recover damages due to the tenant's breach of contract, we find our supreme court 
in U.S. Rubber was merely expanding upon the Simon ruling and explaining a 
theory that has been adopted in this state as well as other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., 
Richman v. Joray Corp., 183 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1950) ("It is the rule in South 
Carolina that when a lessee declines to perform his contract, a cause of action 
immediately arises in favor of the lessor for full damages, present and prospective, 
which were the necessary and direct result of the breach; and the measure of the 
damages is the difference between the rent fixed in the lease and the rental value of 
the premises for the entire term at the time of the breach, together with such special 
damages as may have resulted from the breach.").  Therefore, we hold that Simon
and U.S. Rubber are not mutually exclusive of one another and may be read 
together. 
Although the landlord–tenant relationship was terminated by Tenant's
abandonment and BTC's reentry and reletting of the premises in the instant case, 
we find this sequence of events did not affect Tenant's contractual liability to BTC 
under the lease. Accordingly, we find the master properly concluded BTC was 
entitled to damages measured by the amount BTC would have received as rent for 
the remainder of Tenant's term had there been no default, less the amount of rent 
BTC received from the two subsequent tenants it acquired in an effort to mitigate 
damages.  See U.S. Rubber, 231 S.C. at 95, 97 S.E.2d at 409. 
Because we find BTC was entitled to recover under the theories of both Simon and 
U.S. Rubber, we affirm the master's ruling as modified. 
III. "Damages" Term in the Subject Lease 
Additionally, Tenant argues the master erred in construing the "damages" term in 
the subject lease to entitle BTC to recover future rents.  We disagree. 
Courts should construe contracts liberally "to give them effect and carry out the 
intention of the parties." Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., LLC, 
374 S.C. 483, 497, 649 S.E.2d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted).  When 
construing terms in a contract, a court "must first look at the language of the 
contract to determine the intentions of the parties."  C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S.C. 
Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 296 S.C. 373, 377, 373 S.E.2d 584, 586 
(1988) (citation omitted).  Furthermore, a court must gather the parties' intention 
from the contents of the entire agreement, not from any particular clause therein.  
Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries, 374 S.C. at 498, 649 S.E.2d at 502 (citation 
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omitted).  If practical, a court should interpret the agreement so as to give effect to 
all of its provisions.  See id. (citation omitted).  "It is fundamental that[,] in the 
construction of the language of a contract, it is proper to read together the different 
provisions therein dealing with the same subject matter, and where possible, all the 
language used should be given a reasonable meaning."  Id. at 498–99, 649 S.E.2d 
at 502 (quoting Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 246, 72 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1952)).  
Generally, a contract is "interpreted according to the terms the parties have used, 
and the terms are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular 
sense." Stanley v. Atlantic Title Ins. Co., 377 S.C. 405, 414, 661 S.E.2d 62, 67 
(2008) (citing Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 110, 531 S.E.2d 287, 293 
(2000)).
We find the master properly concluded the parties clearly and unambiguously 
intended for BTC to reserve all rights against Tenant for rents due during the full 
term of the lease.  Unlike the lease at issue in Simon, the subject lease stated BTC 
could reenter and repossess the property without prejudicing its right to damages.  
Because the term "damages" was not specifically defined in the lease, the master 
had to first look to the four corners of the subject lease to determine the meaning 
and effect the parties intended to give the term.  Not only did the lease reserve 
BTC's right to recover damages upon termination, but it also provided a specific 
damages formula in the default provision stating Tenant must pay all costs, 
damages, and expenses BTC suffers by reason of Tenant's default.  The default 
provision further made clear that, upon termination of the lease, Tenant was not 
relieved of future obligations for damages resulting from her breach of the lease. 
Reading the lease as a whole, we find the parties clearly and unambiguously 
intended that, upon default, Tenant would be liable to BTC for the rents due during 
the full term as damages. The "costs, damages, and expenses . . . suffered by 
[BTC] by reason of Tenant's defaults" undoubtedly includes the rent BTC was 
unable to recover during the remainder of the subject lease term due to Tenant's
default. We find no other construction would provide full meaning to all of the 
terms in the lease. 
Accordingly, we affirm the master's finding that BTC was entitled to recover future 
rents as damages from Tenant under the default provision of the lease. 
IV. Extrinsic Evidence 
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Tenant also argues the master erroneously considered extrinsic evidence regarding 
the parties' intent after finding the subject lease was unambiguous.  While we agree 
the master erred in admitting extrinsic evidence, we believe such error was 
harmless. 
In construing or interpreting a contract, "it is axiomatic that the main concern of 
the court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties."  Progressive 
Max Ins. Co. v. Floating Caps, Inc., 405 S.C. 35, 46, 747 S.E.2d 178, 184 (2013) 
(quoting D.A. Davis Constr. Co. v. Palmetto Props., Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 418, 315 
S.E.2d 370, 372 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If its language is 
plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no 
construction is required and the contract's language determines the instrument's
force and effect." Id. (citation omitted).  Moreover, "[i]f a contract is 
unambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to give the contract a meaning 
different from that indicated by its plain terms."  Watson v. Underwood, 407 S.C. 
443, 455, 756 S.E.2d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Bates v. Lewis, 311 S.C. 
158, 161 n.1, 427 S.E.2d 907, 909 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Gordon Farms, Inc. v. Carolina Cinema Corp., 294 S.C. 158, 
160, 363 S.E.2d 235, 237 (Ct. App. 1987) ("No authority is needed for the 
proposition that extraneous evidence is not admissible to alter or vary the terms of 
an unambiguous written contract."). 
"The parol evidence rule prevents the introduction of extrinsic evidence of 
agreements or understandings contemporaneous with or prior to execution of a 
written instrument when the extrinsic evidence is to be used to contradict, vary[,] 
or explain the written instrument."  McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 188, 672 
S.E.2d 571, 576 (2009) (citing In re Estate of Holden, 343 S.C. 267, 275, 539 
S.E.2d 703, 708 (2000)). "Where a written instrument is unambiguous, parol 
evidence is inadmissible to ascertain the true intent and meaning of the parties."  
Id. (citing Holden, 343 S.C. at 275–76, 539 S.E.2d at 708).  Under the parol 
evidence rule, the terms of the writing are controlling, even if extrinsic evidence is 
admitted without objection or admitted over appropriate objection.  Adams v. 
Marchbanks, 253 S.C. 280, 282, 170 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1969) (citations omitted). 
In construing a master's order, an appellate court must do so in light of the master's
intent "as discerned from the order as a whole."  White's Mill Colony, Inc. v. 
Williams, 363 S.C. 117, 123 n.1, 609 S.E.2d 811, 814 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005).  
"Adhering to this principle, this court has refused to hold parties bound by 
language in a lower court order that we found was not necessary to the decision of 
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the issues presented." Id. (citing Weil v. Weil, 299 S.C. 84, 90, 382 S.E.2d 471, 
474 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
In this case, the master interpreted the default provision of the lease in paragraph 
17 of his order and specifically reached the following conclusions:
A more clear, unambiguous intention to reserve all rights 
against [Tenant] for the rents due during the full term is 
more difficult to imagine.  Not only did [BTC] 
specifically reserve its right to damages (i.e., the recovery 
of future rents in the event of termination), but the lease 
provided a specific damage formula by providing 
[Tenant] must pay all costs, damages[,] and expenses as a 
result of default. It is clear the most critical, common[,] 
and obvious "damages" suffered by a [landlord] under a 
commercial lease is the payment of rent, which is the 
primary monetary obligation of the [tenant].  No other 
construction would provide full meaning to all of the 
terms of the Lease. 
In paragraphs 18(a)–(c) and 19, however, the master discussed the correspondence 
between the parties, noting it was further evidence that BTC and Tenant construed 
the subject lease as an obligation for Tenant to pay future rents.  Tenant argues 
that, by referencing certain testimony and exhibits to support his interpretation of 
the lease, the master erred in considering extrinsic evidence outside the four 
corners of the contract. We agree, but we find the master's error was harmless. 
Based upon our review of the order as a whole, we find any error in considering 
extrinsic evidence was harmless because it is reasonable to infer the master was
simply setting forth alternative grounds for his interpretation of the contract.  See 
Williams, 363 S.C. at 123 n.1, 609 S.E.2d at 814 n.1 (noting that, in construing a 
judge's order, an appellate court must do so in light of the judge's intent "as 
discerned from the order as a whole"); Laser Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park 
Assocs., 382 S.C. 326, 336, 676 S.E.2d 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating it was 
"reasonable to infer that the circuit court was setting forth alternative grounds for 
its interpretation of the contract" by referencing certain testimony and exhibits in 
its order). Furthermore, the master's interpretation—based on the extrinsic 
evidence presented at trial—was consistent with the contract's language.  See Laser 
Supply, 382 S.C. at 336, 676 S.E.2d at 145; see also Jensen v. Conrad, 292 S.C. 
68 

  
 
 
169, 172, 355 S.E.2d 291, 293 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding a judgment will not be 
reversed for insubstantial errors that do not affect the result). 
Accordingly, while the master erred in referencing extrinsic evidence in his order, 
we find the master was merely setting forth alternative grounds for his 
interpretation that the damages term in the lease unambiguously entitled BTC to 
future rents. Thus, we affirm the master's conclusion on this point because any 
error in referencing the extrinsic evidence was harmless, particularly when the 
master's interpretation was consistent with the contract's language. 
V. Tenant's Cross-Examination of Landlord 
Tenant further argues the master abused his discretion by not allowing her to cross-
examine Watson about language in the subject lease as well as language in two 
subsequent leases BTC entered into with different parties.  We disagree. 
A. Language in the Subject Lease 
Tenant contends the master erred in sustaining BTC's objection to the line of 
questioning during her cross-examination of Watson regarding BTC's intent behind 
specific language in the subject lease.  Tenant argues that, because the master 
considered extrinsic evidence in reaching his decision, he abused his discretion by 
not allowing her to introduce evidence regarding intent.  We find this issue is not 
properly preserved for appellate review. 
"An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is not supported by 
authority or is only conclusory."  Potter v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. 7, 395 S.C. 17, 
24, 716 S.E.2d 123, 127 (Ct. App. 2011); see also S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Mother, 375 S.C. 276, 283, 651 S.E.2d 622, 626 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding an issue 
abandoned because the appellant made "a conclusory argument without citation of 
any authority to support her claim"); Hunt v. S.C. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 
573, 595 S.E.2d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Issues raised in a brief but not 
supported by authority are deemed abandoned and will not be considered on 
appeal."). 
In her brief, Tenant merely provided a recitation of the trial transcript and made a 
conclusory argument, while citing no legal authority to support her claim.  
Therefore, we find this issue is abandoned and not preserved for appellate review.  
See Hunt, 358 S.C. at 573, 595 S.E.2d at 851.
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B. Language in Two Subsequent Leases 
Tenant next contends the master erred in sustaining BTC's objection to the line of 
questioning during her cross-examination of Watson regarding language in two 
subsequent leases BTC entered into with two different tenants.  Specifically, 
Tenant claims the master improperly sustained BTC's objection "on the grounds of 
inadmissibility as a subsequent remedial measure" pursuant to Rule 407, SCRE.1 
We find this issue is not properly preserved for appellate review. 
Because the master clearly sustained BTC's objection on relevance grounds, 
Tenant's argument that he committed legal error by sustaining the objection 
pursuant to Rule 407, SCRE, is without merit.  Aside from Rule 407, Tenant failed 
to cite any authority in support of her conclusory argument that the master erred in 
sustaining BTC's objection.  Therefore, we find this issue is abandoned and not 
preserved for appellate review. See Hunt, 358 S.C. at 573, 595 S.E.2d at 851.
VI. Ambiguity 
Finally, Tenant argues the master erred by failing to recognize the lease terms were 
ambiguous.  We find this issue is not preserved for appellate review. 
"It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."  Herron 
v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 465, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) (citing Wilder 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  An argument not presented to the master on the record is not 
preserved for appellate review. See Knight v. Waggoner, 359 S.C. 492, 496, 597 
S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating appellants' justifications for a specific 
finding were asserted for the first time on appeal and, therefore, were not preserved 
for appellate review); Wilson v. Builders Transp., Inc., 330 S.C. 287, 294, 498 
S.E.2d 674, 678 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that an argument not presented to the trial 
court on the record is not preserved for appellate review). 
1 Under Rule 407, SCRE, "When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in 
connection with the event."
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Based upon our review of the record, Tenant never argued to the master that the 
terms of the contract were ambiguous.  In fact, when the master stated "no one told 
[him] that this is an ambiguous contract," Tenant replied, "I have not said it is an 
ambiguous contract."  Therefore, we find Tenant's ambiguity argument is not 
preserved for appellate review because it was not raised to and ruled upon by the 
master.2 See Knight, 359 S.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 896; Wilson, 330 S.C. at 294, 
498 S.E.2d at 678. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the master's decision is 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
GEATHERS and McDONALD, JJ., concur. 
2 Tenant also argues the master erred in not construing ambiguous terms against 
the drafter of the lease.  In light of our finding that Tenant's ambiguity argument is 
not preserved, we need not reach the second prong of Tenant's argument.  See 
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 
591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when 
its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). 
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GEATHERS, J.:  Appellant Thomas Rickerson appeals the trial court's dismissal 
of his notice of intent to file suit (NOI) with prejudice after Rickerson failed to 
comply with the mandatory mediation requirement of section 15-79-125 of the 
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South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014). We reverse the trial court's decision and 
remand this case. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice case.  Rickerson alleged that an 
antibiotic prescribed to him by Dr. John Karl and nurse practitioner and clinical 
specialist Virginia Bell (collectively, Respondents) negatively interacted with 
medication that had previously been prescribed for him by other physicians.  As a 
result, Rickerson developed complications, including bleeding and renal failure, 
and had to be hospitalized. 
On May 15, 2012, Rickerson filed an NOI pursuant to section 15-79-125,1 which 
requires that parties in a medical malpractice action participate in a mediation 
conference within 120 days after the service of an NOI.  Rickerson failed to state 
in the NOI that the case was subject to mandatory mediation and failed to include a 
line for the clerk of court to write in the name of a mediator.2  Over the next few 
months, Respondents made numerous requests for Rickerson's medical records, 
and Rickerson authorized their collection of the records.  During this time, the 
1 Section 15-79-125 governs the prelitigation requirements for medical malpractice 
cases. Specifically, section 15-79-125 requires that a plaintiff, prior to filing or 
initiating a medical malpractice claim, "contemporaneously file [an NOI] and an 
affidavit of an expert witness, subject to the affidavit requirements established in 
Section 15-36-100." § 15-79-125(A). "Filing the [NOI] tolls all applicable statutes 
of limitations."  Id.  Thereafter, the parties engage in discovery.  § 15-79-125(B). 
Within ninety days and no later than 120 days from the service of the NOI, the 
parties must participate in a mediation conference.  § 15-79-125(C). If the matter 
is not resolved through mediation, the plaintiff may initiate the civil action by 
filing a summons and complaint.  § 15-79-125(E).
2 Rule 4(c) of the South Carolina Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules (SCADRR) 
states that in cases subject to presuit mediation under section 15-79-125(C), the 
NOI "shall contain language directed to the defendant(s) that the dispute is subject 
to pre-suit mediation within 120 days and must contain a place for the names of the 
primary and secondary mediators."  It further states that "the [c]lerk of [c]ourt shall 
appoint a primary mediator and a secondary mediator" when the NOI is filed.  Rule 
4(c), SCADRR. 
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parties did not discuss mediation and made no attempt to schedule the mandatory 
mediation conference.
On December 13, 2012, the clerk of court filed a notice of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) and appointed a mediator to the case. After Rickerson received 
the notice, he contacted Respondents to set a date and time for mediation, but 
Respondents did not respond to the scheduling inquiry.  Rickerson subsequently 
contacted the court-appointed mediator and requested that the mediator schedule 
the mediation for January 22, 2013.  
Rickerson mailed a letter to Respondents on December 20, 2012, notifying them 
that he had scheduled a mediation conference with the court-appointed mediator; 
however, that same day, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss.  In the motion, 
they contended the case should be dismissed with prejudice because the mediation 
conference had not been held within the 120-day statutory time frame.3 
Because the statute of limitations had not yet run,4 Rickerson filed an amended 
NOI on January 4, 2013, notwithstanding the pending motion to dismiss.  Unlike 
the initial NOI, the amended NOI contained the name of the court-appointed 
mediator and the required statement that the case was subject to presuit mediation 
pursuant to section 15-79-125(C).
The court-appointed mediator later contacted the parties to reschedule the 
mediation. Rickerson agreed to mediate the case at a later date, but Respondents 
refused. In a letter to the mediator, Respondents stated that Rickerson failed to 
propose dates for presuit mediation within the statutory time frame and did not 
request an extension from the trial court. They further asserted that because the 
NOI should be dismissed, "no authority exist[ed] statutorily for the holding of the 
3 Rickerson served the last defendant with the NOI on June 19, 2012; thus, to 
comply with the 120-day statutory deadline, mediation should have occurred by 
October 17, 2012.
4 The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is three years "from the 
date of the treatment, omission, or operation giving rise to the cause of action or 
three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been 
discovered." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545(A) (2005).  Rickerson's complications 
arose in July 2011; therefore, the statute of limitations would have run in July 
2014.
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pre-suit mediation." In a subsequent letter, the mediator stated that because of the 
"conflicting positions regarding the intent of the parties to mediate [the] case," he 
thought it would be inappropriate for him to issue a mediation results report to the 
court. Instead, he recommended the parties direct the dispute to the trial court for 
adjudication.
The trial court held a hearing on Respondents' motion to dismiss in April 2013.  
During the hearing, the court focused on the fact that no attempt had been made to 
schedule mediation until more than two months after the 120-day presuit mediation 
deadline. 
The following month, the trial court issued an order of dismissal.  In the order, the 
court stated that Rule 37(b), SCRCP, "authorizes dismissal of an action with 
prejudice as a lawful sanction." It determined that the sanction of dismissal was 
warranted in this case and granted Respondents' motion to dismiss Rickerson's 
NOI with prejudice. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in dismissing Rickerson's NOI with prejudice after he failed 
to comply with the 120-day mediation deadline set forth in section 15-79-125(C)?  
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision of whether to impose sanctions is generally entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 45, 362 S.E.2d 317, 
318 (Ct. App. 1987). This court will not interfere with a trial court's exercise of its 
discretion with respect to the imposition of sanctions unless an abuse of discretion 
has occurred. Karppi v. Greenville Terrazzo Co., 327 S.C. 538, 542, 489 S.E.2d 
679, 681 (Ct. App. 1997). The party appealing the order has the burden of 
establishing that the trial court abused its discretion. Id.  "An abuse of discretion 
occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded 
in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."  Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 
369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000). 
LAW/ANALYSIS
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Rickerson argues the trial court erred in dismissing the NOI with prejudice because 
the sanction of dismissal was not warranted under the circumstances and because 
the statutory time frame of section 15-79-125 was not jurisdictional.  We agree the 
trial court is not divested of jurisdiction in the instant case.  We also agree that the 
sanction of dismissal with prejudice was not warranted under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Our legislature enacted section 15-79-125 as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005 
Relating to Medical Malpractice, which requires that a medical malpractice 
plaintiff file and serve the NOI before the plaintiff may initiate a civil action.  § 15-
79-125(A). After the plaintiff serves the NOI, the parties are required to 
participate in a mediation conference.  Specifically, subsection (C) provides: 
Within ninety days and no later than one hundred twenty 
days from the service of the [NOI], the parties shall 
participate in a mediation conference unless an extension 
for no more than sixty days is granted by the court based 
upon a finding of good cause. 
§ 15-79-125(C). 
Subsection (C) does not list any consequences for failing to timely comply with the 
mediation conference requirement. It does, however, provide that the mediation 
process is governed by the ADR rules,5 unless the rules are inconsistent with the 
statute. § 15-79-125(C). 
Rule 10(b), SCADRR, provides that if a party fails to comply with the ADR rules, 
"the court may . . . impose upon that party, person or entity, any lawful sanctions, 
including, but not limited to, the payment of attorney's fees, neutral's fees, and 
expenses incurred by persons attending the conference; contempt; and any other 
sanction authorized by Rule 37(b), SCRCP."  Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), SCRCP, the 
trial court may impose sanctions such as striking pleadings, rendering a default 
judgment, or, as it did in the instant matter, dismissing the action.  
5 Rule 1(c), SCADRR, also provides that the ADR rules "shall govern all 
mediations in [m]edical [m]alpractice actions as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
79-120 and S.C. Code Ann. § 15-79-125(C)." 
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"A dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) is not mandatory; rather, the trial court is 
allowed to make such orders as it deems just under the circumstances, and the 
selection of a sanction is within the court's discretion."  Kershaw Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 302 S.C. 390, 395, 396 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1990). "When 
the court orders default or dismissal, or the sanction itself results in default or 
dismissal, the end result is harsh medicine that should not be administered lightly."  
Griffin Grading & Clearing, Inc. v. Tire Serv. Equip. Mfg. Co., 334 S.C. 193, 198, 
511 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1999).  A sanction that results in a default or 
dismissal is a severe punishment that should be imposed only if there is some 
showing of bad faith, willful disobedience, or gross indifference to the rights of the 
adverse party. Id. at 198-99, 511 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Baughman v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 109, 410 S.E.2d 537, 542 (1991)).  "[T]he sanction 
imposed should be reasonable, and the [c]ourt should not go beyond the necessities
of the situation to foreclose a decision on the merits of a case."  Balloon 
Plantation, Inc. v. Head Balloons, Inc., 303 S.C. 152, 154, 399 S.E.2d 439, 440 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
In those cases in which South Carolina appellate courts have reviewed dismissals 
of actions under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), the courts have generally upheld the trial court's 
decision to use dismissal as a sanction only when necessary to protect the rules of 
discovery or when there was evidence of bad faith, misconduct, willful 
disobedience, or a callous disregard for the rights of other litigants.  In Davis v. 
Parkview Apartments, our supreme court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a 
dismissal order as a sanction.  409 S.C. 266, 283, 762 S.E.2d 535, 544 (2014).  The 
court determined that the sanctions imposed were not unduly harsh in light of the 
appellants' willful and repeated failure to comply with various orders of the trial 
court, which resulted in unnecessary delay and prejudice to the respondents.  Id.; 
see also McNair v. Fairfield Cnty., 379 S.C. 462, 467, 665 S.E.2d 830, 832-33 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (finding "the severe sanction" of striking the defendant's answer 
appropriate in light of the defendant's failure to produce documents seven and a 
half months after the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to compel, which this 
court determined amounted to willful disobedience and resulted in delay and 
prejudice to the plaintiff's right to have the claim heard); QZO, Inc. v. Moyer, 358 
S.C. 246, 257-58, 594 S.E.2d 541, 548 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding the trial court 
properly considered the severity of the sanction when it struck a pleading based on 
the appellant's intentional defiance of the trial court's order and his willful 
destruction of evidence); Griffin Grading & Clearing, Inc., 334 S.C. at 199, 511 
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S.E.2d at 719 (finding the striking of the defendant's answer as a discovery 
sanction was warranted based on the defendant's egregious failure to comply 
meaningfully with four prior orders compelling discovery, even after being warned 
of the consequences of its failure to comply and after being assessed attorney's
fees). 
On the other hand, a sanction amounting to a judgment of default or dismissal has 
been deemed "too severe" without a showing of intentional misconduct or willful 
disobedience. For example, in Kershaw County Board of Education, our supreme 
court determined that dismissal was too severe of a sanction for the plaintiff's 
failure to comply with a court order to notify the defendants before it removed 
asbestos. 302 S.C. at 394-95, 396 S.E.2d at 371-72.  The court based this 
determination on the fact that dismissal would not protect the rules of discovery 
and there was no evidence of intentional misconduct by the plaintiff.  Id. at 395, 
396 S.E.2d at 372; see also Orlando v. Boyd, 320 S.C. 509, 511-12, 466 S.E.2d 
353, 355 (1996) (holding that precluding a witness from testifying was an abuse of 
discretion without a showing of intentional misconduct when exclusion amounted 
to a judgment of default or dismissal); Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 298 S.C. 
127, 129-30, 378 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1989) (holding a $100 fine, not dismissal with 
prejudice, was the appropriate sanction for the eight plaintiffs' failure to answer 
interrogatories even despite warnings from the trial court and prior sanctions 
because the requesting party had not been prejudiced by not receiving formal 
responses to the interrogatories). 
Moreover, in several recent decisions, our supreme court has chosen to reverse 
dismissals based on a technical application of the requirements of section 15-79-
125 in favor of allowing cases to proceed on the merits.  In Ross v. Waccamaw 
Community Hospital, our supreme court addressed the consequences of failing to 
comply with the prelitigation mediation requirement of section 15-79-125.  404 
S.C. 56, 59, 744 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2013). The court rejected the argument that 
noncompliance mandated a penalty of dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, determining the mediation time period set forth in section 15-79-125 
was not intended to place limitations on the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.  
Id. at 63-64, 744 S.E.2d at 550-51. Instead, it held that "failing to comply with the 
120-day statutory time period is a non-jurisdictional procedural defect."  Id. at 64, 
744 S.E.2d at 551. It further found the trial court "retains discretion to permit the 
mediation process to continue beyond the 120-day time period and may consider 
principles of estoppel and waiver to excuse noncompliance."  Id.
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The Ross court clarified that the 120-day time period for mediation was not 
meaningless and could result in dismissal; however, it emphasized that a dismissal 
is "a function of the court's discretion based on the facts and circumstances," not "a 
mandated one-size-fits-all result." Id.  It explained that "the Legislature enacted 
section 15-79-125 to provide an informal and expedient method of culling 
prospective medical malpractice cases by fostering the settlement of potentially 
meritorious claims and discouraging the filing of frivolous claims."  Id. at 63, 744 
S.E.2d at 550. Consequently, the court expressly declined to "construe section 15-
79-125 as a trap for plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims"; instead, it stated 
that courts should "avoid dismissal of cases on technical grounds and . . . allow 
adjudication on the merits." Id. at 63, 65, 744 S.E.2d at 550-51 (quoting Schulz v. 
Nienhuis, 448 N.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Wis. 1989)); see also Wilkinson v. E. Cooper 
Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 410 S.C. 163, 174, 763 S.E.2d 426, 432 (2014) (discussing the 
supreme court's intent "to permit medical malpractice cases to proceed on the 
merits rather than to affirm unwarranted dismissals based on technical 
noncompliance with the medical malpractice statutes"); see, e.g., Grier v. AMISUB 
of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 535, 540-41, 725 S.E.2d 693, 695, 698 (2012) 
(reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim under section 15-79-125 
and holding that the prelitigation expert affidavit does not need to include an 
opinion as to proximate cause and, therefore, the prelitigation affidavit was 
sufficient, allowing the medical malpractice claimant's case to proceed). 
In this case, Rickerson filed his NOI in May 2012.  The NOI did not include the 
required notice that the case was subject to mandatory presuit mediation pursuant 
to section 15-79-125. Further, the NOI did not contain a place where the clerk of 
court could fill in the names of a primary and secondary mediator.  According to 
the parties, they did not discuss mandatory mediation at all during the 120-day 
time frame. 
Although Rickerson failed to properly complete his NOI and failed to initiate the 
scheduling of mandatory mediation during the 120-day time frame, there is no 
indication that his failure to comply with the mandatory mediation requirement of 
section 15-79-125 was the product of bad faith, misconduct, willful disobedience, 
or a callous disregard for the rights of other litigants.  During the hearing on 
Respondents' motion to dismiss, Rickerson's counsel stated: 
79 

  
 
 
 
  
                                        
The view that I took from the time limits that are set in 
the statute is that unless the parties were enforcing those 
and made an issue of those time limits, that as long as the 
discovery process was continuing to unfold and neither 
party was concerned about running out of time in order to 
mediate the case, that it would be acceptable to the 
parties to mediate the case when the parties became ready 
to do that. 
Additionally, he pointed out that "there was an attempt to work with 
[Respondents], to cooperate in their collection of medical records."  This statement 
is supported in the record.  After Rickerson filed his NOI, Respondents' attorney 
filed numerous subpoenas for Rickerson's medical records, and Rickerson 
authorized Respondents' collection of the records.  
Furthermore, once the clerk of court appointed a mediator in December 2012— 
after the mediation deadline imposed by section 15-79-125—Rickerson quickly 
contacted the court-appointed mediator to schedule the mediation conference.  
Although Respondents did not reply to Rickerson's scheduling inquiry, Rickerson 
scheduled the conference for January 22, 2013.  Later, he was willing to reschedule 
after being notified that the mediator had a conflict.
The Ross court acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, dismissal may be 
an appropriate response to the failure to comply with the 120-day deadline.  404 
S.C. at 64, 744 S.E.2d at 551.  However, we do not find this to be a case in which a 
dismissal with prejudice is warranted. The purpose of the mandatory mediation 
requirement of section 15-79-125 is to foster the settlement of potentially 
meritorious claims and to discourage the filing of frivolous claims; therefore, a 
technical noncompliance with this statute, without bad faith, should not result in 
the dismissal of the case.  See id. at 63, 65, 744 S.E.2d at 550-51. We reverse the 
trial court's dismissal of Rickerson's NOI with prejudice.6 
6 In his brief, Rickerson raises several additional reasons why he believes the trial 
court erred in dismissing his NOI with prejudice.  In light of our decision above, 
we need not address these arguments.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding that 
appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing 
Rickerson's NOI with prejudice and remand the case to the trial court.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.   
WILLIAMS and McDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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